The 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is a tightly scripted gathering to anoint President Xi Jinping for a precedent-breaking third term as general secretary, institutionalising his totalitarian rule. The twice-a-decade event has been dressed up to look like a consultative assembly, representing the will of China’s 1.4 billion people. But it is actually a rubber stamp exercise to ensure that the concentration of power in Xi’s hands is complete.
Since his advent in 2012, Xi has stamped out dissent with systematic ruthlessness, reminiscent of his role model Mao Zedong. Xi’s series of “strike hard” campaigns were couched as reforms to clean up the governance system, but they enabled him to become the “core leader” with no challengers.
“Xi Jinping thought” is inscribed in China’s constitution. The collegial leadership model — in which Xi’s predecessors rotated in and out of power and decided policies through coordination among CCP factions — is decimated. The journey from one-party rule to one-man rule has been vicious, with Xi unleashing neo-Maoist and neo-Confucian ideology to maximise his hold on China.
A megalomaniac with a heightened sense of historical grandeur, his speeches are laced with quotes from ancient Chinese thinkers and emperors who justified a strong State and hard leadership style. Notwithstanding the CCP’s self-proclaimed revolutionary role to break China free from two millennia of imperialism, Xi’s dream of restoring Chinese greatness is guided by the notion of an ancient “civilisational State” which attained its zenith under despotic rulers.
But the biggest danger is Xi’s excessive personalisation of power. With internal checks and balances extinguished, the fate of the Chinese people rests on Xi’s judgment. Corrective mechanisms to alter policies that misfire or to jettison approaches that fail are now missing.
The onset and global spread of Covid-19 and the subsequent draconian lockdowns which dragged the Chinese economy to its lowest point in 40 years, gave a glimpse of what is to come in Xi’s second decade. He will double down on decisions and use his commanding position to railroad the Chinese people to follow his diktats at all costs.
As China expert Minxin Pei puts it, long-lasting autocrats who extend their rule indefinitely could place the wrong bets, “embark on more ambitious and riskier courses of action” and “bring disasters to their regimes and people”. With China’s demography in decline and its economy entering a new normal of low Gross Domestic Product growth, what the country needs is a breath of fresh air. Instead, it is getting an overdose of Xi eyeing the presidency for life.
Internationally, we will see a more expansionist China. In the run-up to the 20th Congress, Xi avoided a direct clash with China’s principal adversary, the United States (US), to maintain “stability” and secure his third term. But according to Chinese scholar Yun Sun, occasional foreign restraint is a “short-term tactic” as Xi consolidates total power at home. He is likely to grow bolder in pushing back at the US, pressuring Taiwan, Japan, the Southeast Asian countries and India.
Xi’s opening speech at the 20th Congress vowed to “never commit to abandoning the use of force” to reunify Taiwan. It was an ominous sign that he will escalate military crises with external adversaries as he believes the international configuration of forces is turning in China’s favour. Xi’s regional hegemonic push is guided by the historical mindset of China as the Middle Kingdom with inherent civilisational superiority and pre-eminence over its neighbours.
Xi’s vow to “accelerate the building of a world-class military” and his demonstrated readiness to apply coercive force to impose China’s will on adversaries are alarming. India, in particular, stands in the way of Xi’s march to dominate Asia and overtake the US. As India closes the power gap with China in the coming decade, Xi could decide that he has to first deal a pre-emptive blow and cut India down to size before clashing with the more powerful US. India must factor in Xi’s increasing belligerence and prepare for limited wars and stronger counter-balancing coalitions. From being called “Uncle Xi” to “Grandpa Xi”, China’s leader has come a long way. These Confucian labels cannot disguise the greater menace that he represents today and into the future.
Sreeram Chaulia is professor and dean, Jindal School of International Affairs
The views expressed are personal
