A long-running discussion at the core of international law has been rekindled by the recent US military strike within Venezuelan territory that resulted in President Nicolás Maduro’s arrest and transfer to New York: How strong is the prohibition on the use of force in a time of unilateral action? Although Washington has attempted to portray the operation as a law enforcement action against a leader who has been charged with a crime, the incident highlights more serious issues regarding jurisdiction, sovereignty, and the progressive change in the laws controlling force between States. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has expressed his deep concern that the action of the US sets a dangerous precedent and may flout the UN Charter.
At the centre of this debate lies Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits States from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State. This clause has long been considered a pillar of the international legal system that emerged after 1945. International lawyers have long cautioned that the ban on the use of force is most vulnerable to gradual erosion through practice and interpretation rather than outright rejection.
States rarely reject the ban on the use of force outright. Rather, they use expansive interpretations of self-defence to defend acts that would typically be forbidden by international law. As time goes on, this weakens the rule. This trend is well reflected in the recent strike on Venezuela.
Regardless of how it was termed, the US strike was a use of force on the territory of a sovereign State. The only two restricted justifications for the use of such force recognised by international law are the consent of the UN Security Council and the use of self-defence in response to an armed attack. Neither criterion appears to have been fulfilled in this case.
No matter how serious, criminal allegations, especially those pertaining to drug trafficking, do not qualify as “armed attack” under Article 51 of the Charter. There was also no mandate from the UNSC approving military action. The threshold for justifiable violence would be drastically lowered if States were permitted to use criminal activity as an excuse for military intervention.
International law distinguishes clearly between the use of military force and law enforcement, allowing the use of force only under extreme circumstances. A State may not deploy its armed forces within the territory of another sovereign State merely because an individual, even a sitting head of State, has been accused or indicted under its domestic law.
Enforcement jurisdiction is territorial in nature. Arresting a serving president inside his own country without consent violates not only the territorial sovereignty of that State, but also the rules of personal immunity recognised under customary international law. These immunities are not meant to shield individuals permanently from accountability, but to ensure stability and orderly relations between States.
Once military force is used between two States, the situation may go on to be categorised as an international armed conflict, even if the operation is limited in duration or scope. This brings the application of international humanitarian law into picture, immediately, including the Geneva Conventions, with obligations relating to civilian protection, proportionality, and humane treatment. This consequence underscores why international law has traditionally placed a high threshold on the use of force. What begins as a purportedly “targeted” operation can quickly generate broader legal and humanitarian ramifications.
American legal scholar Thomas M Franck had cautioned that repeated reliance on expansive justifications, such as indirect aggression, necessity, or preventive action, could normalise conduct once considered exceptional. This would result not in the formal death of Article 2(4), but its gradual marginalisation. The Venezuelan episode is an example of this danger.
The broader implications of this strike extend well beyond the Americas. For many States in the Global South, international law, especially Article 2 (4) has served as a critical restraint on power asymmetries. Weakening of prohibition on force disproportionately affects those least able to resist coercive action. For example, respect for territorial integrity, multilateralism, and sovereignty has always been important to India. From such a perspective, the Venezuela operation raises uncomfortable questions about the future of the provisions of the UN Charter and the sincerity of legal restraints on unilateral military action.
The US strike on Venezuela is not only an isolated geopolitical event, but a test of whether international law can continue to function as a meaningful check on state power. Whether the international community responds to the Venezuelan episode with legal clarity or quiet acquiescence will help determine whether Article 2 (4) remains a cornerstone of international law or merely a rhetorical superlative.
Jyoti Singh is a Delhi-based lawyer. The views expressed are personal
