In the two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States’ hubristic achievement of its “unipolar moment”, few would have anticipated the slow geopolitical landslide that is unravelling the established order in the world today. This was marked by Sweden abandoning its two-century-old neutrality to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the starkest threat of nuclear weapons use issued by President Vladimir Putin over western support to Ukraine.
In his State of the Nation speech a few days ago, Putin denied that his country planned to attack Europe but simultaneously warned that any increase of support to Ukraine “really risks a conflict using nuclear weapons, which means the destruction of all civilisation”. The context was French President Emmanuel Macron’s suggestion of sending western troops to beleaguered Ukraine. Macron’s own context was, perhaps, Donald Trump’s declaration last month that if European countries were delinquent in their defence spending, “I would encourage them (Russia) to do whatever the hell they want”.
In his speech, Putin invoked history when he recalled “the fate of those who once sent their contingents to our country”. The list of those who were humbled by Russia includes not just NATO stalwarts France and Germany, but Sweden as well, whose imperial ambitions suffered a catastrophic defeat at Poltava, now part of Ukraine, in 1709. Now, Putin added, potential interveners would suffer a tragic fate since “we also have weapons that can strike targets on their territory”.
Coincidentally, on the day Putin issued his warnings, the Financial Times had a major exclusive, based on leaked Russian military files of the 2008-2014 period that included training scenarios for war, not just in Europe, but also surprisingly, China. The main point that emerged was that Russian forces had rehearsed using tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage of a conflict with a major world power. Russia has strategic nuclear weapons which mainly target the US. There is a similarity between the Russian doctrine and that of Pakistan which developed tactical nuclear weapons after India unrolled its Cold Start doctrine. Fed up with its inability to deter Pakistani terror attacks because of the slow pace of its mobilisation that enabled Islamabad to undertake a counter-mobilisation, the Indian Army worked out a doctrine that could have their forces entering Pakistan in quick time. To negate India’s advantage, Pakistan decided to develop tactical nuclear weapons.
The common assumption is countries that have nuclear weapons will use them only as a last resort. But countries like Russia and Pakistan believe that the military balance is against them and fear that their adversaries will overwhelm them with their conventional forces unless they use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. While countries like India and China broadly offer a “no-first-use” pledge, neither Russia nor Pakistan, or for that matter, the US, provide it.
The big problem with tactical nuclear weapons is that the authority for their employment has to, necessarily, be delegated to the commanders forward on the ground. Whereas the employment of strategic weapons can be carefully controlled by the highest authorities of the land.
Just how seriously these developments are being taken is reflected in the decisions of Finland and Sweden to join NATO. Having been defeated by Russia in World War II, Finland lost territory to the erstwhile Soviet Union and had a somewhat precarious existence in the Cold War when “Finlandisation” became a byword of enforced neutrality. As a result of its misadventures in the Napoleonic wars, in 1812, Sweden adopted neutrality for two centuries, which allowed it to sit out both the World Wars and the Cold War. But the Russian invasion of Ukraine has compelled a change of course.
What will the accession of the two countries to NATO mean? Both countries did have informal defence ties with fellow Scandinavian countries and the US, but NATO membership is qualitatively different. Having planned all this time to defend themselves without allies, the two had developed significant capabilities which they now bring into the alliance.
Finland shares a 1,340-km border with Russia and its accession has doubled NATO’s border with Russia. It brought along substantial military capability into the alliance and the mobilisation strength of a 285,000-strong army. The Swedes for their part will come with a strong naval component built around their ability to dominate the Baltic Sea. The Swedish Air Force, one of the largest in Europe, will also make a major contribution. In addition, they will come with strong defence R&D and industry that will benefit the alliance’s military-industry capacity. By all accounts, Sweden has developed some of the world’s most formidable cyber defence capabilities.
All these developments need to be seen in light of the steady expansion of NATO, a development that has been viewed as threatening by Russia and triggered the Ukrainian crisis. In the present circumstances, the Baltic republics that joined NATO in 2004 see themselves as a frontline of sorts. The population of ethnic Russians in two of them — Estonia and Latvia — is around 24%.
The Ukraine war itself is currently stalemated. With the summer offensive of 2023 having failed, Kyiv is unlikely to attempt another one this year. With American assistance blocked in the US Congress, things don’t look too good for Kyiv. In any case, what we have seen till now is that western assistance has been fitful and inadequate and undermined by the American need to supply artillery ammunition to Israel since last October.
But to jump from here to the point where Macron suggested western boots on the ground in Ukraine will be a leap too far and will definitely elicit a strong Russian response. We should be clear that the Ukraine war is likely to be a long one and attrition rather than manoeuvre will be key. The challenge is Europe’s ability to support Ukraine, especially since American isolationist sentiments are surging.
But it still remains important to ensure that it does not lead to a larger Russia versus NATO configuration. There have been worries about the intentions of President Putin who has himself denied that Moscow had no intention of invading “Poland, Latvia or anywhere else”. But the problem with war is that while it is relatively easy to start one, it is very difficult to forecast its course or the circumstances of its termination.
Manoj Joshi is a distinguished fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal
