The death of former ambassador Chandrashekhar Dasgupta earlier this year struck a chord for those who track India’s climate politics and foreign policy. His leadership resulted in installing and defending equity at climate negotiations through the notion that developing countries held common but different responsibilities (CBDR) on mitigation, given per capita carbon emissions. It’s a testament to Dasgupta’s remarkable diplomatic acumen that this particular principle remains rooted when India discusses climate matters at annual Conference of Parties (COP) meetings.
New Delhi continues to resist and rebuff calls to erode the differentiation between developed and developing countries. Though CBDR remains relevant, India’s climate persona has adapted, willing to work with and leverage existing and emerging international regimes and frameworks to advance its widening climate interests. What you see now is an India that is diplomatically agile and nimble, working across multilateral, bilateral and minilateral forums to secure financing, technology, and capacity to drive decarbonisation.
Climate politics has fragmented beyond COP settings as countries are exploring and clinching new ways to drive climate mitigation and adaptation. To be sure, multilateral climate engagement continues to hold sway. COP discussions form a key node in India’s climate diplomacy as international climate politics disaggregates across levels and frameworks. Besides COP, multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank remain important partners for climate progress.
For example, India remains a key priority under the World Bank’s 2021-2025 Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) that supports global climate mitigation. Similarly, India has worked with UNDP through the India-UN Development Partnership Fund to establish climate-warning systems for seven vulnerable Pacific island countries. Since 2017, India has associated with the International Energy Agency to influence energy security outcomes.
Multilateral climate activities remain important. But the terrain has moved wider and beyond — to bilateral, minilateral and other frameworks. Of late, New Delhi has emphasised bilateral climate cooperation through partnerships with the European Union, the United States (US), Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom. Progress on clean and renewable energy and green technologies form a critical plank of India’s climate policies towards the European Union, most recently with the Trade and Technology Council, and with the US under the Strategic Clean Energy Partnership.
India and France have established a road map on the blue economy to conserve and sustainably use oceans, seas and maritime resources through greater scientific research, infrastructural cooperation, coastal zone management, and development of new technologies; Paris and Delhi also established the International Solar Alliance (ISA) that advances solar energy access.
At the minilateral level, India is working with different mechanisms such as the Quad with Australia, Japan and the US to advance climate progress. All Quad member-States have pledged to focus their efforts to achieve COP targets, covering national emissions and clean energy deployment. There’s optimism that the Quad, given its loose informal structure, can gradually include other issues on climate resilience, preparedness or adaptation, and not just mitigation.
Quad countries could also extend their climate cooperation to the Pacific Islands through the blue economy programme that seeks to cleanse the oceans and maritime areas, home to critical resources such as fish, rare earths and biodiversity. Also important is India’s engagement with the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, a global partnership designed to promote resilient infrastructures as climate risks rise.
Such frameworks across multilateral, bilateral and minilateral levels are not exhaustive but illustrative of India’s diffuse but strategic climate engagement. This year, India has a unique opportunity to use its G20 presidency to drive climate cooperation. Delhi assumed the G20 leadership as crises abound and the desire for deep climate action is dwindling. To retain global attention on the climate crisis, India should continue to reinforce the message that developed countries must find new ways to fulfil, not deflect or delay, existing pledges.
Discussing the issue of multilateral development banks reform at G20 is another way to highlight their importance to advance the climate cause. India’s ability to serve as a bridge between the developed and developing world can also be further explored through triangular climate partnerships in the Global South. Another opportunity exists to leverage the G20 and its pillars to drum up requisite climate finance, especially fusing both public and private capital to drive climate action. Green transitions must be a global, not a Global North endeavour.
All these frameworks — bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral — will be crucial to facilitate India’s climate transition. Climate and energy issues for both mitigation and adaptation will become a core foreign policy interest as countries realise the importance of domestic climate action to minimise and offset the pernicious effects of climate change. That international policy climate is changing and India is already adapting to it.
Karthik Nachiappan and Constantino Xavier are respectively research fellows at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal
