Skirmishes between hundreds of Chinese troops trying to cross the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the eastern Tawang sector and well-prepared Indian forces who “contested” the intruders in a “firm and resolute manner” confirm that we are in an era of iterated rounds of conflict between Asia’s two biggest powers. The fire that China lit by resorting to violence at Galwan Valley in June 2020 is far from extinguished. Rather, it is smouldering and threatening to flare up at different junctures along the 3,488-kilometre-long LAC as Beijing periodically ups the ante. After securing a record third consecutive term and concentrating all powers in his hands, president Xi Jinping is turning his attention to unfinished business, especially establishing China’s hegemony in Asia and achieving a Sino-centric regional order. Notwithstanding lofty rhetoric about a “community of common destiny for mankind”, on the ground, China is taking the gloves off and indicating it is ready to use force to impose its ever-expanding claims and preferences on neighbours.
As Army chief General Manoj Pande remarked, China acts contrary to what it says and one must focus on Chinese actions rather than words or written scripts. The latest actions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Navy — ranging from Tawang in the high Himalayas to Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean — speak loud and clear that Beijing seeks to establish a fait accompli and pressure New Delhi to toe its line. The Chinese objective is not merely to gain tactical advantages at specific territorial points but also to bend Indian foreign policy to its will so that there is no substantial obstacle to complete the project of Chinese supremacy in Asia.
It is not a coincidence that PLA attempted an incursion in Tawang just days after crying foul about high-altitude joint military exercises that the militaries of India and the United States (US) conducted in Auli, which is about 100 kilometres from the LAC in the middle sector. Beijing believes it has an offensive advantage through which it can repeatedly prick India at the disputed land border and in the Indian Ocean and thereby convey the tough message that aligning with the US or a broader coalition of like-minded countries — such as Quad — to contain China will boomerang.
This playbook applies not only to India. The view that the US is “sowing discord” among Asian countries by intervening in the Indo-Pacific and encouraging Beijing’s neighbours to confront China is entrenched among Xi and his State apparatus. Chinese threats to countries such as the Philippines or Vietnam to dissociate themselves from the US or risk facing more military provocations in the South China Sea mirror Chinese outrage over closer India-US strategic cooperation.
As long as the regional configuration of forces remains inimical to Xi’s stated goal of an “Asia-Pacific Community with a shared future” (ie, an Asia which shuns the West and remains under Chinese suzerainty), he reserves the right to unleash violence to alter the status quo.
Given this aggressive posture underpinned by Xi’s “China dream of national rejuvenation”, incidents such as Tawang are not only likely to recur but increase in quantity and scope. This is because India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is refusing to defer to Chinese prescriptions of what a “harmonious order” in Asia should look like.
Among all the rival Asian neighbours of China, it is only India that has responded forcefully enough to inflict actual casualties on PLA troops. The more adamant and determined India seems to be in standing up for its national security, territorial integrity and foreign policy autonomy, the greater Xi’s frustration and anger. India’s projected higher economic growth rates in the coming decade will also narrow the overall power gap with China, a factor that Xi would be staring at like a ticking clock.
Hence, in the short- to medium-term, a limited China-India war involving firearms (which the two sides have avoided thus far even as their soldiers engage in fierce hand-to-hand fistfights) cannot be ruled out. By dislodging the PLA from five out of seven friction points in recent years and ramping up strategic border infrastructure near the LAC, India has proved its mettle and capacity for credible deterrence against the Chinese juggernaut. But given Xi’s megalomaniacal and hardline mindset, worse may be to come and we should mobilise as a nation for a sustained struggle.
Sreeram Chaulia is professor and dean, Jindal School of International Affairs
The views expressed are personal
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