Their Protection is Not, With Exceptions – The Cipher Brief

OPINION — The pace of U.S. national-security launches over the past several months has been staggering. But buried beneath the impressive cadence is an uncomfortable truth: many of the most sensitive intelligence assets now orbiting Earth remain dangerously exposed to enemy action by hostile actors.

These assets are launched primarily by the National Reconnaissance Office and the U.S. Space Force Space Systems Command, operating under the National Security Space Launch program (NSSL). The government’s private-sector partners – SpaceX and United Launch Alliance (a joint-venture by Lockheed Martin and Boeing) provide the lift capacity using Falcon 9, the soon to enter operations Falcon Heavy (SpaceX), and the newly introduced Vulcan Centaur rocket (ULA).

Congress has long recognized the importance of assured access to space. As the Congressional Research Service notes, U.S. law mandates maintaining at least two launch vehicles capable of delivering any national-security payload to orbit. That policy has worked. The problem is what happens after launch.

Over the past four years, most NRO launches fall into three categories. First are signals-intelligence satellites (SIGINT). Second are large, electro-optical imaging satellites (IMINT) – capable of extraordinary resolution, as the public briefly glimpsed when Donald Trump released an undegraded intelligence image in a startling lapse of operational security. Third are the Starshield (the name of the program) satellites.

Proliferated Architecture represents a strategic shift; its goal is to establish “the largest government constellation in history” consisting of hundreds of satellites with launches planned through 2029. There are roughly half a dozen missions planned for 2026. This project replaces the model of few exquisite, irreplaceable satellites, in favor of resilience through numbers.

That logic is sound – but it applies unevenly.

Proliferation ensures continuity if adversaries degrade or destroy some satellites. Yet the most sensitive NRO platforms – large SIGINT collectors and high-resolution imaging satellites – remain singular, expensive, and irreplaceable. They are also increasingly vulnerable. Both China and Russia are fielding counterspace capabilities that include electronic warfare, cyber intrusion, co-orbital inspection satellites, and direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons.

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In other words, America is hardening its communications backbone while leaving its crown jewels exposed.

Deterrence in space no longer comes from secrecy alone. It requires active protection: improved space-domain awareness, on-orbit maneuverability, electronic countermeasures, rapid reconstitution plans, and – ultimately – the willingness to impose costs on adversaries who threaten U.S. space assets.

The United States has demonstrated it can launch fast, often, and at scale. The next challenge is more difficult and more urgent: ensuring that the satellites underpinning American military power and intelligence dominance can survive in a contested orbital environment.

Starshield redundancy is a start. Protection of existing assets must be the next step. if a rival has the ability to blind, deceive, or degrade satellites, then a lack of clarity may emerge exactly when clarity is most needed. A lack of clarity in a crisis is a catalyst. In fact, space is crowded, competitive, and, more to the point, contested. The dangers?

First, kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and debris. Anti-satellite weapons, such as one that was tested by China in 2007 are some of the most threatening because they have the capability to destroy a satellite.

Second, non-kinetic attacks, like dazzling, jamming, cyber-tampering, and spoofing. The greatest threats on a daily basis are also likely to be non-kinetic, meaning they are temporary or reversible, although still potentially operationally decisive. A threat assessment has found categories of threats such as electronic warfare, cyber, and directed-energy effects that are being developed and employed by hostile nations as part of their counter-space capabilities.

Third, co-orbital proximity operations and grey-zone activity. Proximity operations are activities that are legitimate in themselves. However, the same activities can be used for coercion, interference, and “accidents on purpose.” The issue in this regard is one of attribution. This leads to a gray zone in which norms are important in addition to deterrence. In this regard, the U.S. Space Force has described space domain awareness (SDA) as “the ability to perceive and understand the nature of space-based phenomena to inform decisions.”

The policy should be to combine these elite systems with more distributed architectures: more nodes, more paths, and more means of recovery. Resilience is about the need to ensure that the loss of one satellite’s signal does not cause the end of the entire mission. The Proliferated Architecture (Starshield) program is a step towards that direction. But it’s only one NRO project in place and has redundancies set in place. What can be done to protect other multi-billion satellites already in orbit and not part of a constellation of satellites?

First, apply maneuver, unpredictability and mobility in space, which comes down to strong cyber protection for mission systems and ground networks, encryption and authentication to protect command and telemetry, anti-jamming techniques and alternative communication routes and rigorous integrity checks, such that analysts can rely on the data generated.

Second, engage in rapid reconstitution and continuity of operations including: pre-planned fallback modes, alternate tasking workflows, ground processing surge capacity, and alternatives for reconstituting capability with allied or commercial sources if needed.

When the problem is narrowed down to its core, ensuring the protection of single-operated NRO satellites can be achieved via better access to sensor data and faster decision cycles and a resilient architecture (combination of high-end assets and proliferated assets).

Equally important are end-to-end cybersecurity and integrity controls, debris-conscious operations & sustainability in coordination with civilian agencies such as NASA where necessary and proactive deterrence through resilience and consequence.

NRO satellites are strategic tools, as they reduce uncertainties, detect deception, and enable decision advantage. The threats to these satellites, which are both kinetic and non-kinetic, are rapidly increasing in their sophistication and frequency.

The protection of such satellites has nothing to do with making space a battlefield for its own sake. It has to do with being able to see clearly enough to avoid mistakes that could escalate quickly in space.

The best way to ensure such protection is not through a single technology but through a comprehensive approach that involves situational awareness, resilience, secure data communication, sustainable operations, deterrence and dispersion.

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals.

Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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