Because the starting of Jokowi’s presidency in 2014, the Indonesian Nationwide Armed Forces (TNI) has change into extra concerned in civilian affairs. That is marked by the appointment of retired TNI officers into Jokowi’s cupboard, elevated reliance on the TNI’s territorial command system, and the opening of extra positions for TNI officers in ministries and state establishments.[1]
Students level to the motivation and skill of the TNI in explaining this development. The TNI desires to strengthen its political affect over state laws and insurance policies to safeguard its materials pursuits.[2] TNI officers additionally tenaciously maintain onto the mindset that they’re the “guardians of the nation”.[3]
Current literature additionally highlights the alternatives for the TNI to achieve extra affect in civilian affairs throughout Jokowi’s tenure. Jokowi’s lack of familiarity with safety and defence affairs, in addition to his lack of background from the political and army elite, has made it vital for him to ally with (current and retired) officers to regulate the TNI.[4]
Nevertheless, absent from the present literature is how the rise of Islamic extremism has created extra alternatives for the TNI to intrude in civilian affairs. Right here, I outline extremism as “the intolerance of the opinions of others, such that one believes it’s acceptable to drive others to just accept one’s place on faith, both bodily or intellectually”.[5] The rise of Islamic extremism in Indonesia is clear in two methods. Firstly, the recognition of extremist Islamist teams has grown, particularly in areas the place mainstream Muslim authorities – the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah – are weakly institutionalized.[6] Secondly, the variety of Islamic terrorist assaults in Indonesia has elevated from 2010 to 2020.[7] Contemplating that Islamic extremism constitutes a part of the political context wherein the TNI and Indonesian state interacts with each other, we must always anticipate it to have some ramifications on the civil-military relations in Indonesia. Due to this fact, I ask: How has the rise of Islamic extremism facilitated the TNI’s intrusion into civilian affairs?
This essay goals to fill this literature hole. I argue that the TNI has exploited the rise of Islamic extremism to assert extra stake in Indonesia’s inner safety affairs, with the intention of enhancing its materials pursuits. Below Basic Gatot Nurmantyo’s management from 2015 to 2017, the TNI collaborated with hardline Islamists in its “proxy conflict” towards “new-style communism”. It additionally capitalized on the upsurge of Islamic terrorism to legitimatize its involvement in counterterrorism. After Air Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto took over the helm in 2018, the TNI leveraged the rise in Islamic terrorism to push for a brand new anti-terrorism legislation that codified its position in counterterrorism.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. Part One introduces the fabric curiosity of the TNI. Part Two examines the TNI beneath Basic Gatot Nurmantyo’s management from 2014 to 2017. Part Three explores the TNI beneath Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto’s management from 2018. Lastly, Part 5 concludes.
Materials Pursuits of the TNI
Like most militaries, the salient materials pursuits that the TNI seeks to defend embrace: (i) sustaining its inner cohesion, self-discipline, and morale; (ii) defending its picture, status, and legitimacy; and (iii) securing its materials pursuits, starting from personnel promotions to the defence price range.[8] The TNI perceives that its materials pursuits are being threatened by inner and exterior elements.
Internally, the TNI has a protracted the excess of mid-career army officers – primarily colonels and generals – with inadequate promotion alternatives. Surpluses happen when there are too many officers and too few positions obtainable for them. Between 2011 and 2017, the Indonesian Military (TNI-AD) had a surplus of about 30 generals and 330 colonels per 12 months on common.[9] This annual surplus is projected to extend to about 500-600 colonels by 2027.[10] Considerably, which means there might be extra officers competing for every promotion alternative sooner or later, thereby intensifying the rivalry among the many youthful era of officers.
And the laggards are more likely to change into bitter. One cause is that these officers are sometimes re-classified as Out of Formation (Luar Formasi) personnel and given “non-jobs” resembling “particular assistants” to numerous places of work or headquarters.[11] Unsurprisingly, these officers are likely to change into stressed and discontented as their status and standing erodes. One more reason is that these officers typically really feel that they deserved a promotion (versus their friends). This arises as a result of promotions at increased ranks and senior appointments are primarily distributed based mostly on political patronage, fairly than a meritocratic course of.[12] All through the TNI, senior officers domesticate private loyalty and assist by mentoring juniors, whose private obligation to the senior “bapak” is deep and long-lasting.[13] Therefore, promotions inside the TNI are related to arbitrariness and corruption, making those that are excluded resentful.
Due to this fact, the TNI management is cautious that the extended surplus of army officers might exacerbate factionalism inside the TNI. As officers bitterly compete for scarce organizational sources, army factionalism is a recurring sample.[14] Within the Seventies, it arose between supporters of Basic Ali Moertopo, Particular Operations Chief and Basic Sumitro, Head of Suharto’s secret police. Within the Nineties, factionalism emerged between followers of Lieutenant Basic Prabowo Subianto, the Military Particular Forces Commander, and Basic Wiranto, the Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Due to this fact, the TNI perceives its surplus of army officers as an inner risk to its materials pursuits.
Externally, the TNI’s intention to increase its stake in Indonesia’s inner safety is commonly opposed by the Indonesian nationwide police (POLRI). In 1999, the POLRI was formally separated from the army, resulting in the switch of the inner safety position from the army to the POLRI. Nonetheless, the TNI has remained unwilling to fully give up its stake in inner safety as it should endanger the existence of its territorial command construction, which was launched in 1979 to anchor the army in native affairs. In up to date occasions, the TNI continues to connect nice significance to sustaining its territorial command construction, as a result of it facilitates casual political transactions between officers and politicians on the native degree.[15] Furthermore, the territorial instructions function a large platform to accommodate the excess of officers within the TNI.[16] Below the pretext of safeguarding Indonesia’s inner safety, resembling combating terrorism or quelling civil unrests, the TNI can justify the relevance of its territorial instructions.
Crucially, the TNI is cautious of the POLRI’s opposition in direction of its intrusions into issues of inner safety. The POLRI has constantly labored to make sure that the TNI stays a junior accomplice within the counterterrorism turf. It seeks to stop the TNI from gaining the authorized authority (by way of Indonesia’s anti-terrorism laws) to hold out counterterrorism operations independently. It additionally advocates that the TNI stays subordinated to the POLRI’s directives in any joint operations between the 2 organizations. Furthermore, the POLRI has strengthened its elite counterterrorism unit – the Densus 88 – to cut back its reliance on the TNI’s particular forces to mount operations.[17] As such, the TNI perceives that its stake in inner safety is just not sufficiently secured but.
In brief, the TNI perceives that its materials pursuits are being threatened by its inner concern of surplus officers, in addition to the potential opposition of the POLRI towards its involvement in home safety issues. The subsequent two sections will study how the TNI has leveraged the rise of Islamic extremism to protect its materials pursuits by claiming extra stake in Indonesia’s inner safety affairs.
TNI’s politics beneath Basic Gatot
In July 2015, Basic Gatot Nurmantyo was appointed because the TNI Commander and saddled with challenges to the army’s materials pursuits. The TNI’s inner cohesion was threatened by the excess of officers, in addition to Gatot’s personal lack of assist in both the Kopassus or Kostrad. Furthermore, the POLRI continued to claim its dominance over inner safety issues and resisted the TNI’s encroachment. What then was Gatot’s technique to protect the TNI’s materials pursuits?
TNI-Islam rapprochement towards “new-style communism”
Gatot’s reply was the invention of a proxy conflict towards “new-style communism” that would bolster the TNI’s position in inner safety. In accordance with Gatot, Indonesia was not beneath direct assaults, however was invisibly penetrated by international powers which aimed to foster social cleavages and destabilized the nation to steal its wealthy pure sources. He iterated that international powers had been planting international values in Indonesian society, primarily by way of teams that advocated for LGBT rights, social equality, human rights, environmental safety, and extra. Gatot’s conspiracy principle added that many of those social teams may very well be the forces that deliberate to revive the Indonesian Communist Social gathering (PKI), which was all however eradicated by Suharto’s military within the Nineteen Sixties.[18] Gatot then pressured that the TNI should spearhead efforts to crush this “new-style communism” and forestall it from taking up Indonesia.
Crucially, the TNI relied upon the assist of hardline conservative Islamist teams to propagate its narrative of a proxy conflict towards “new-style communism”. These Islamist teams discovered a pure affinity with the TNI’s proxy conflict, as a result of they genuinely believed that the infiltration of ‘international’ concepts had eroded Indonesian values and unity. They therefore performed an energetic position in fueling the TNI’s proxy conflict. Firstly, well-known conservative Islamist teams – such because the Islamic Defenders Entrance (FPI) and the Indonesia Mujahidin Council – helped legitimize the existence of the “new-style communism” by way of their propaganda campaigns. For instance, they utilized public speeches and social media to unfold false and deceptive information that China makes use of its investments as a ploy to export lots of migrant staff, who had been illegally dwelling throughout Indonesia and circulating Chinese language communism in villages.[19] Secondly, conservative Islamist teams supported the TNI’s implementation of its main social program – termed “Defend the Nation” (Bela Negara) – towards the invisible “new-style communism”. This program imposed short-term army coaching on the general public at every native army command. In areas the place Islamic extremism was sturdy, Islamist teams grew to become extremely influential in galvanizing members of the general public to take part in this system.[20] In addition they grew to become main individuals of this system – in January 2017, the TNI was discovered to be offering army coaching for members of the “anti-vice” vigilante group Fron Pembela Islam (FPI) in Lebak, Banten.[21] Total, the Bela Negara program is predicted to recruit 100 million cadres throughout the archipelago by 2025.[22]
Considerably, the TNI started emphasizing that its territorial command system was important to implement the Bela Negara program all through Indonesia, which was essential to suppress the specter of “new-style communism”.[23] This enhanced the legitimacy of the territorial instructions and helped rebuff any try at dismantling them. On the identical time, the TNI pressured the Indonesian authorities into offering extra price range to the native instructions – about $4.5 million yearly – to run this system.[24] This has enabled the TNI to scale up this system and enhance the variety of army personnel stationed on the native instructions, therefore serving to to ameliorate the difficulty of surplus officers. Due to this fact, the “proxy conflict” – together with the important assist of conservative Islamic teams – has helped the TNI to protect its materials pursuits.
Claiming a bigger stake in combating Islamic terrorism
Moreover, beneath Gatot’s management, the TNI exploited the general public’s concern over the rise of Islamic terrorism to assert extra stake in counterterrorism. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in 2014 and its energetic recruitment of Indonesians had sparked deep fears that the havoc created by ISIS within the Center East would quickly come to Indonesia.[25] This concern was exacerbated by the January 2016 assaults, which had been the primary main acts of terror in years.[26] A number of explosions went off across the Sarinah advanced, the earliest foreign-style shopping center in Indonesia, inflicting the dying of 4 civilians in whole. ISIS claimed accountability for the assaults. TNI’s public statements additional fueled public fears. In June 2017, for example, Basic Gatot claimed: “Nearly in all Indonesian provinces, apart from Papua, there are ISIS sleeper cells.”[27] Terrorism analysts had been fast to refute Gatot’s hyperbole.[28]
Past stirring public fears, the TNI was equally adept at increasing its position in counterterrorism. By its propaganda, the TNI portrayed itself as an important accomplice to the POLRI in counterterrorism. Specifically, it trumpeted its success in looking down and killing Santoso, the chief of the terrorist group East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT), in a joint army and police operation in July 2016.[29] The TNI then pressured the significance of its territorial command system in offering complete intelligence that reached proper right down to the remotest village and the skilled manpower essential to mount large-scale counterterrorism operations.[30] Considerably, this enhanced the legitimacy of the territorial command system, which has allowed the TNI to determine extra district-level instructions (with the acknowledged intent of supporting counterterrorism operations).[31] Once more, this not solely helped ameliorate TNI’s concern of surplus officers, but in addition strengthened the TNI’s grip over inner safety affairs. Due to this fact, the TNI has efficiently leveraged the rise of Islamic terrorism to protect its materials pursuits throughout Gatot’s tenure because the TNI Commander.
TNI’s politics beneath Air Chief Marshal Tjahjanto
Nevertheless, Gatot’s boisterous actions drew the ire of Jokowi. The proxy conflict demagogy had fostered opposition in direction of Jokowi, who had welcomed international direct funding from China for infrastructure growth. Additionally, the TNI’s reproachment with hardline Islamists might empower the latter of their opposition towards Jokowi. This might compromise Jokowi’s standing within the 2019 presidential election. As such, Jokowi expediated the appointment of Air Chief Marshal Tjahjanto Hadi – a better ally – in December 2017 to interchange Gatot.[32] Much like his predecessor, Tjahjanto should deal with the excess of army officers and protect TNI’s stake in counterterrorism. Below his management, the TNI would leverage the rise of Islamic extremism to institutionalize its stake in counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the TNI would stop its proxy conflict and enhance its ties with the POLRI.[33]
Cementing TNI’s stake in counterterrorism
In Might 2018, a sequence of terrorist assaults shocked Indonesia. From Might 8 to 10, Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) extremists mounted a hostage siege on the headquarters for the POLRI Cell Brigade in South Jakarta, throughout which they executed 5 officers.[34] On Might 13, a middle-class household – together with the spouse and youngsters – bombed three church buildings in Surabaya.[35] The next day, one other ISIS-inspired household on two bikes detonated themselves at a Surabaya police publish.[36] These devastating assaults had been not like every other Indonesians have ever seen. They not solely signaled an escalation of the ISIS-linked risk, but in addition that on a regular basis of us and ladies more and more had been energetic perpetrators of violent extremism. Moreover, the involvement of youngsters advised that jihadists had been indoctrinating younger Indonesians and fostering new generations of jihadists. This stirred public stress upon the Indonesian authorities to quell the rise of Islamic terrorism.
This created an opportune time for the TNI to push for a brand new anti-terrorism legislation that might codify its position in counterterrorism. Up until that the Might 2018 assaults, the TNI’s makes an attempt had been futile. As early as February 2016, the Jokowi administration had submitted an anti-terrorist draft invoice to the Parliament. The conservative opposition faction – comprised of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and the Higher Indonesia Motion Social gathering (Gerindra) – argued that an incumbent authorities might use the brand new legislation to oppress Islam and the political opposition.[37] This led to a impasse within the Parliament. Nevertheless, within the aftermath of the Might 2018 assaults, no occasion or faction needed to be seen as obstructing the negotiation course of.[38] This inspired the Parliament and Jokowi’s cupboard to put aside their variations and work rapidly towards a compromise.
Recognizing this shift, the TNI took meticulous steps to facilitate the passing of the brand new anti-terrorism invoice. Firstly, Tjahjanto negotiated a draft invoice with Tito that accommodated each the TNI’s and POLRI’s pursuits.[39] This entailed compromises from the TNI and POLRI however ensured that each organizations had been united in advocating for the draft invoice, thereby facilitating its acceptance within the Parliament. Tjahjanto then collaborated with Tito and the DPR Chair Muhammad Syalfi to socialize and negotiate the provisions of the draft invoice with members of the parliament – by way of private conferences and calls – previous to the parliament sitting in Might.[40] This helped safe the required votes for the invoice to move in Parliament. Lastly, on the recommendation of Tjahjanto and Tito, Jokowi issued the Parliament an ultimatum to revise the anti-terrorism legislation by the top of its June sitting time period, or he would use his government powers to concern a Governmental Regulation in Lieu of Regulation (Perppu).[41] Unwilling to be bypassed on a problem of excessive nationwide significance, the Parliament was pressured into passing the invoice.
On Might 25, the Parliament handed the anti-terrorism invoice into legislation, thereby institutionalizing the TNI’s position in counterterrorism. Below this new legislation, the TNI was legally permitted to take part in counterterrorism actions solely when requested to take action by the POLRI and with the approval of the President. Whereas this barred the TNI from enterprise any unbiased anti-terrorist operations, it codified the TNI’s position in counterterrorism.[42] On this authorized foundation, the TNI would step by step cement its stake in counterterrorism. Within the latter half of 2018, the TNI and POLRI mounted a number of joint operations focused on the terrorist teams JAD and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).[43] In July 2019, the TNI reactivated its Joint Particular Operations Command (Koopsus), which includes personnel from the Military’s Particular Forces (Kopassus), the Navy’s Denjaka specialised squad, and the Air Power’s Bravo-90 Particular Power.[44] Past mounting counterterrorism operations, the Kopassus would additionally strengthen and handle the intelligence networks on the territorial instructions to facilitate the early detection of terrorists. The Koopsus is predicted to obtain an annual working price range of US$106.9 million.[45]
Total, this enhances the TNI’s materials pursuits. The institution of a brand new unit and growth of the territorial command system create extra positions for officers, which helps alleviate the TNI’s structural concern of surplus officers. Furthermore, the improved legitimacy of the territorial command system ensures its longevity, strengthening the TNI’s presence throughout the archipelago. Due to this fact, the TNI has efficiently leveraged the rise of Islamic extremism to reinforce its materials pursuits.
Conclusion
In brief, this essay argues that the TNI has exploited the rise of Islamic extremism to assert extra stake in Indonesia’s inner safety affairs, with the target of preserving its materials pursuits. Below Gatot, hardline Islamists grew to become the TNI’s companions in a “proxy conflict” towards “new-style communism”. The TNI additionally capitalized on the escalation within the incidents of Islamic terrorism to legitimatize its involvement in counterterrorism. Below Tjahjanto, the TNI leveraged the rise of Islamic terrorism to advance a brand new anti-terrorism legislation that codified its position in counterterrorism.
There are maybe different secondary explanations on how the rise of Islamic extremism has facilitated the TNI’s intrusion into civilian affairs. Jokowi might genuinely consider that bolstering the army’s involvement in counterterrorism helps mitigate threats of terrorism. Moreover, the Indonesian public would possibly agree that the TNI can present worthwhile assist to the POLRI’s counterterrorism operations. Nonetheless, this essay demonstrates that the TNI’s want to protect its materials pursuits is vital to explaining how the rise of Islamic extremism has facilitated its intrusion into Indonesia’s civilian affairs.
What then lies forward? The specter of Islamic extremism is more likely to persist in Indonesian society. Simply in March 2021, two terrorist assaults and the arrest of almost 100 suspects highlighted that pro-Islamic States cells and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) cells stay energetic.[46] The TNI is unlikely to stay glad with enjoying second fiddle to the POLRI in counterterrorism and can exploit such alternatives to increase its turf. Civil society activists who’re involved concerning the militarization of counterterrorism and the encroachment of the TNI in civilian affairs ought to, subsequently, proceed retaining the TNI in test.
Finish Notes
[1] Natalie Sambhi, ‘Generals Gaining Floor: Civil-Navy Relations and Democracy in Indonesia’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/generals-gaining-ground-civil-military-relations-and-democracy-in-indonesia/#cancel.
[2] Evan A. Laksmana, ‘Civil-Navy Relations beneath Jokowi: Between Navy Company Pursuits and Presidential Handholding’, Asia Coverage 26, no. 4 (2019): 63–71, https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2019.0047.
[3] Natalie Sambhi, ‘Generals Gaining Floor’.
[4] Emirza Adi Syailendra, ‘President’s Particular Relationship with Luhut Panjaitan’, accessed.2 November 2021, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CO16209.pdf.
[5] Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, ‘Conflating Muslim “Conservatism” with “Extremism”: Analyzing the “Merry Christmas” Saga in Singapore’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 37, no. 3 (3 July 2017): 344–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1379690.
[6] Alexandre Pelletier, ‘How Competitors for Non secular Authority Breeds Islamist Militancy in Java’, The Dialog, accessed 2 November 2021, http://theconversation.com/how-competition-for-religious-authority-breeds-islamist-militancy-in-java-146919.
[7] World Terrorism Database, ‘Indonesia: Variety of Incidents’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.begin.umd.edu/gtd/search/Outcomes.aspx?chart=time beyond regulation&search=Indonesia.
[8] Eva Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism within the Center East: Classes from the Arab Spring’, Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–49.
[9] Evan A. Laksmana, ‘Reshuffling the Deck? Navy Corporatism, Promotional Logjams and Submit-Authoritarian Civil-Navy Relations in Indonesia’, Journal of Up to date Asia 49, no.5 (2019): 806-836.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, ‘Inside The TNI: Profession Patterns, Factionalism, And Navy Cohesion’, in The Navy and Democracy in Indonesia, 1st ed., Challenges, Politics, and Energy (RAND Company, 2002), 53–68.
[12] Laksmana, ‘Reshuffling the Deck?’
[13] Robert Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (Allem & Unwin, 1996), 125.
[14] Laksmana, ‘Reshuffling the Deck?’
[15] Muhamad Haripin, Chaula Rininta Anindya, and Adhi Priamarizki, ‘The Politics of Counter-Terrorism in Submit-Authoritarian States: Indonesia’s Expertise, 1998–2018’, Protection & Safety Evaluation 36, no. 3 (2 July 2020): 275–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2020.1790807.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Greg Barton, ‘How Indonesia’s Counter-Terrorism Power Has Turn into a Mannequin for the Area’, The Dialog, accessed 2 November 2021, http://theconversation.com/how-indonesias-counter-terrorism-force-has-become-a-model-for-the-region-97368.
[18] Jun Honna, ‘Civil-Navy Relations in an Rising State: A Perspective from Indonesia’s Democratic Consolidation’, in Rising States at Crossroads, ed. Keiichi Tsunekawa and Yasuyuki Todo, Rising-Economic system State and Worldwide Coverage Research (Singapore: Springer, 2019), 255–70, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2859-6_12.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Luke Lischin, ‘Indonesia: Bela Negara Motion Plan and Pandering to the Navy | The Interpreter’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-bela-negara-action-plan-and-pandering-military.
[22] ‘The Harmful Ideology behind Bela Negara’, New Mandala (weblog), 25 January 2017, https://www.newmandala.org/dangerous-ideology-behind-bela-negara/.
[23] ‘Bela Negara: Thinly Veiled Militarisation of the Civilian Inhabitants’, Indonesia at Melbourne, accessed 2 November 2021, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bela-negara-thinly-veiled-militarisation-of-the-civilian-population/.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Jacques Bertrand and Jessica Soedirgo, ‘Islamic Extremism and Fundamentalism In Indonesia’, CIGI Papers, no.95, accessed 2 November 201, https://www.cigionline.org/static/paperwork/paper_no.95_web.pdf.
[26] Adam Fenton and David Worth, ‘ISIS, Jihad and Indonesian Regulation: Authorized Impacts of the January 2016 Jakarta Terrorist Assaults’, Points in Authorized Scholarship 14, no. 1 (1 August 2016): 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1515/ils-2016-0255.
[27] Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, ‘Indonesia Has ISIS Sleeper Cells in Nearly All Provinces: Navy Chief’, The Straits Instances, 13 June 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-has-isis-sleeper-cells-in-almost-all-provinces-military-chief.
[28] ‘Consultants Forged Doubt over Indonesian Basic’s IS Feedback – RSIS’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/media-highlight/icpvtr/experts-cast-doubt-over-indonesian-generals-is-comments/.
[29] Sidney Jones, ‘Santoso Lifeless: Now for the following Chapter’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/santoso-dead-now-next-chapter.
[30] Jasminder Singh, ‘Operation Tinombala: Indonesia’s New Counter-Terrorism Technique’, RSIS Commentary, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CO16251.pdf.
[31] Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, ‘Indonesia Has ISIS Sleeper Cells in Nearly All Provinces: Navy Chief’, The Straits Instances, 13 June 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-has-isis-sleeper-cells-in-almost-all-provinces-military-chief.
[32] Bradley Wooden, ‘Jokowi’s Navy Reshuffle Is All about 2019’, New Mandala, 15 December 2017, https://www.newmandala.org/jokowis-military-reshuffle-2019/.
[33] N. Adri, ‘Navy and Police Chiefs Vow to Keep Neutrality throughout Elections – Nationwide – The Jakarta Submit’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/information/2018/03/28/military-and-police-chiefs-vow-to-maintain-neutrality-during-elections.html.
[34] Joe Cochrane, ‘ISIS-Linked Indonesian Jail Riot Ends as Police Raid Cellblock’, The New York Instances, 9 Might 2018, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/world/asia/indonesia-isis-hostages.html.
[35] ‘Household of Six Carried out Bombings at Three Indonesia Church buildings, Killing 13 Folks, SE Asia Information & Prime Tales – The Straits Instances’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/attack-on-indonesia-church-leaves-one-dead-several-injured.
[36] Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, ‘Surabaya Police HQ Assault: Household of 5, Together with 8-Yr-Outdated Little one, Carried out Suicide Bombing, SE Asia Information & Prime Tales – The Straits Instances’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/explosion-at-surabaya-police-headquarters.
[37] Leo Suryadinata, ‘Islamism and the New Anti-Terrorism Regulation in Indonesia’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/photos/pdf/[email protected].
[38] Greta Nabbs-Keller, ‘Indonesia’s Anti-Terror Regulation: Disaster to Consensus’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indonesia-anti-terror-law-crisis-consensus.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] ‘Jokowi to Difficulty Perppu If Home Fails to Revise Terror Regulation – Politics – The Jakarta Submit’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/information/2018/05/14/jokowi-to-issue-perppu-if-house-fails-to-revise-terror-law.html.
[42] Suryadinata, ‘Islamism and the New Anti-Terrorism Regulation in Indonesia’.
[43] Nabbs-Keller, ‘Indonesia’s Anti-Terror Regulation: Disaster to Consensus’.
[44] ‘Indonesian Navy Anticipated to Play Higher Function in Counterterrorism – Nationwide – The Jakarta Submit’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/information/2018/05/17/indonesian-military-expected-to-play-greater-role-in-counterterrorism.html.
[45] ‘Jokowi Revives Particular Navy Power to Assist Police Fight Terrorism – Nationwide – The Jakarta Submit’, accessed 2 November 2021, https://www.thejakartapost.com/information/2019/07/25/jokowi-revives-special-military-force-to-help-police-combat-terrorism.html.
[46] Erwida Maulia, ‘Fears Develop over Indonesia’s Terrorism Menace after Current Assaults’, Nikkei Asia, accessed 2 November 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Terrorism/Fears-grow-over-Indonesia-s-terrorism-threat-after-recent-attacks.
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