Terrorism just isn’t an finish in itself however a means to a political finish (Hutchinson, 1978; Drake, 1998: 53; Chenoweth and Moore, 2018). The act of terrorism might be outlined because the intentional risk or use of pressure to create a psychological response, as an illustration, to evoke concern as a sign to the broader inhabitants or to attain wider political objectives resembling affecting a political end result (Chenoweth and Moore, 2018). Second, ideology, one of the crucial elusive ideas in social science (see McLellan, 1995), will likely be understood as ‘an action-orientated set of political concepts’ for the aim of this essay (Heywood, 2017: 299; Brahami, 2019). Ideology particularly gives an account of: (i) the present order; (ii) the specified future; (iii) a proof of how political change must be led to (Heywood, 2018: 4). This essay argues that terrorists want an ideology as a result of an ideology is important to outline an overarching goal and targets, to have an inside justification for assaults, and, for the terrorist organisation at giant, to draw sources and recruits. This argument is structured as follows. Firstly, I current my predominant argument that an ideology is important for the intention, execution, and expansionof terrorist exercise. I exemplify this level with the terrorist instances of Anders Behring Breivik, Elliot Rodger, and Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel whose assaults had diverging ideological underpinnings and totally different ranges of organisation. Secondly, I current the rationalist objection to this argument that terrorism is usually a rational alternative to attain materials positive aspects, glory, and significance, with out the necessity for ideology. Third, in response, I argue that this objection fails for 3 causes: (1) terrorism is a statistically unsuccessful means to an finish (Abrahams, 2006); (2) it’s troublesome to discern a rationalist technique from its ideological tenets; (3) on a person degree, it’s unlikely that terrorism is a rational pursuit for materials positive aspects. Fourthly and at last, I elevate the second counterargument that terrorists do not want an ideology as a result of psychological circumstances (sicknesses) might be the only driver of radicalisation. I’ll argue that this objection fails as a result of an assault with the only intention of hurt just isn’t terrorism, however illicit violence. This leads me to conclude that terrorists want an ideology.
To start with, terrorists want an ideology as a result of ideology is important for the intention, execution, and growth of violent extremist exercise (Holbrook and Horgan, 2019). Ideology, as a collective prism to view and make sense of the world, gives a lens by which one defines a function or goal and deems a state, establishment, or an individual responsible or deserving of assault (Drake, 1998). For terrorists, ideology particularly (1) defines the overarching goal in addition to corresponding targets, (2) gives the interior justification for the execution of assaults, and (3) for organisations at giant, attracts sources and recruits. Terrorists, thus, want an ideology. Take as an illustration the instance of Elliot Rodger, the then 22-year-old incel-motivated terrorist, who attacked a sorority home and killed 4 individuals (Witt, 2020: 675). The incel (self-identifying involuntary celibates) ideology is basically composed of three beliefs: (i) the societal hierarchy is set on the premise of bodily look; (ii) girls are drawn solely to males based mostly on their bodily attractiveness with out regard for character; (iii) girls are chargeable for their isolation and rejection (Hoffman et al., 2020; Gentry, 2022). Collectively, this worldview is designed to have far-reaching societal results (intention), targets violence primarily at girls (targets), permits people to justify the assaults (justification), and attracts sources and recruits (growth) (Hoffman et al., 2020: 565). Rodger’s 133-page manifesto proved that his incel-ideology was his final motivation for his lone-wolf terrorist assault (Allely and Faccini, 2017). Equally, Anders Behring Breivik’s, the Norwegian mass assassin, 1,518-page manifesto clearly demonstrates that ideology was the explanatory issue of his terrorist assaults on July 22, 2011 (Hagtvet et al., 2011; Berntzen and Sandberg, 2014; Gullestad, 2017). The Good terrorist assault, then again, exemplifies how terrorist organisations at giant want ideology to draw recruits. Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, the terrorist who murdered 86 individuals in Good on Bastille Day, looked for on-line Islamist extremist content material a number of days earlier than the occasion, which gave him the interior particular person justification for the terrorist assault (Horgan, 2008; Holbrook and Horgan, 2019). The position of ideology in terrorism is, nevertheless, not inflexible however fluid; for some terrorists, the ideological elements may be extraordinarily salient, as Rodger’s and Breivik’s manifestos present, for others, it may be extra delicate, as Lahouaiej-Bouhlel brief on-line search exemplifies. Nonetheless, as Kellen Konrad (1982: 10) states: ‘[a] terrorist with out a trigger just isn’t a terrorist’.
One may strongly push again on this argument by arguing that terrorists don’t want an ideology as a result of collective rational or socio-organisation impetuses drive terrorism as an alternative. This entails that terrorism is usually a strategic, rationalist alternative and power of the final resort to efficiently obtain materials positive aspects, glory, and significance with out any ideological issues taken under consideration. The important thing assumptions of this strategy are: (1) preferences are secure over time; (2) terrorist teams are unitary actors (Neumann and Smith, 2007; Chenoweth and Moore, 2018). To exemplify this objection, take as an illustration Clarke’s (2004) view on the rationale behind the 9/11 assaults: he argues that Al Qaeda’s assaults have been strategically meant to induce the U.S. right into a battle within the Center East and unify the Islamic world. This rationalization solely adopts a rationalist perspective and implies that terrorists do not want ideology on an organisational degree. It, thus, understands terrorism as an efficient coercive technique (Abrahms, 2006: 42). Different rationalist theorists concluded that rationality additionally efficiently applies within the case of Chechnya or suicide bombing (Sandler et al., 1983; Dugan et al., 2005; Hepworth, 2013). This organisational rationalization invokes the query: do terrorists on an particular person degree want an ideology to execute the assaults? This view on terrorism additionally understands particular person selections to be the results of cost-benefit analyses that do not have to embody any ideological elements. For example, these advantages could embody the perceived risk of glory and the fulfilment of the hunt for significance (see Borowitz 2005 and McBridge 2011). McCauley and Moskalenko (2010: 89) argue that some may be a part of a terrorist group looking for connection and comradeship. Moreover, Brahimi (2019) places ahead the view that terrorism might be a method out of problematic former life. For example, in keeping with Brahimi (2019: 298), the explanations for Choudhury, a key recruiter for the Al Qaeda community, to assist the terrorist organisation have been the misuse of his sister-in-law’s cash to go to prostitutes in Singapore and his faked most cancers analysis. Briefly, one may push again on the view that terrorists want an ideology by arguing that for each people and organisations, materials or social advantages may outweigh the prices of terrorism with none want for ideological issues.
But, this counterargument is problematic in, at the least, 3 ways. First, terrorism is an unsuccessful means to an finish provided that the strategic goals of terrorist teams are solely achieved seven % of the time (Abrahams, 2006: 43). As a substitute of specializing in single case research (cf. Abrahams. 2004) or a variety of some notorious assaults (see Lake, 2002), the research by Abrahams (2006) analyses the political plight of 28 terrorist organisations since 2001, which led to the conclusion of the seven % success fee. The discovering of a poor fee signifies that terrorists’ coercive technique is fairly ineffective and, subsequently, an irrational technique, as one can not argue that it’s, on common, a rational technique. Second, it’s troublesome to discern whether or not Al Qaeda’s technique was a provocation technique or an inadvertent consequence of an overarching ideological pursuit. Particularly when the general technique included non-rational selections. That is the case for ISIS’s resolution to symbolically seize the small village of Dabiq in 2014; the city is of no strategic significance however is described in a prophecy by the Prophet Mohammad and was, subsequently, taken on ideological and non-rational grounds (Gambhir, 2014; Wignell et al., 2017: 7). Third and at last, on a person degree, if solely rational (materials) impetuses can drive terrorism, why accomplish that few individuals grow to be terrorists? And why not commit non-ideological crimes as an alternative? This hints at different explanatory components at play, ideological issues as I argue, but others argue that these can solely be psychological sicknesses as I’ll focus on within the subsequent paragraph. Altogether, these three shortcomings permit me to refute the rationalist objection. Earlier than we conclude that terrorists want an ideology, we should first take into account a selected psychological strategy that pulls onto psychological sickness as a counterargument.
Lastly, one can argue that terrorists do not want an ideology as a result of psychological components resembling narcissistic rage, paranoia, thrill-seeking, or revenge can drive people to radicalisation (Horgan, 2019). There may be proof that psychological sickness is usually related to terrorists (Gill et al., 2015). By means of this lens, one can perceive terrorism because the collective behaviour of people with the only motive of inflicting harm and hurt, bodily or psychologically (Lawal, 2002: 23). If inflicting hurt is the sole motive, then it ought to be doable to be a terrorist with out the necessity for an ideology. We will, nevertheless, push again on this line of reasoning with a two-folded critique. First, there is no such thing as a prevailing proof that psychological sicknesses or psychological circumstances usually play a key position in predetermined terrorist participation or motion (Horgan, 2019: 209). Crenshaw (1981) and Richardson (2007), subsequently, doubt the worth of explaining terrorists as psychologically disturbed and even word that terrorists are notable for his or her normalcy. Second, if one acts with the only function to inflict hurt, that’s, with none want for ideological issues, then it shouldn’t matter who they aim nor can there be an overarching (political) goal. If so, following the aforementioned definition and most prevailing understandingof terrorism, then it’s not terrorism however illicit violent exercise as an alternative. This particular psychological strategy, thus, fails to sufficiently push again on this essay’s predominant argument that terrorists want an ideology. Nevertheless it does trace at a possible mixture of explanatory components of terrorism, as an illustration, psychological and ideological components, as within the case of Anders Behring Breivik who suffered from narcissistic character dysfunction amongst different circumstances and firmly adopted his ideology (see Faccini and Allely, 2016). But, with out an ideological underpinning, it’s not terrorism however illicit violence, and subsequently by definition, terrorists want an ideology.
To conclude, this essay argued that terrorists want ideology as a result of it’s needed for the intention, execution, and growth of terrorist exercise. Firstly, utilizing the assaults of Rodger, Breivik, and Lahouaiej-Bouhlel as examples, I argued that particular person terrorists want ideology to outline an overarching goal and targets and to have an inside justification for assaults and, for the terrorist organisation at giant, to draw sources and recruits. Secondly, I introduced the principle objection to this argument. This objection argues that terrorists do not needan ideology as a result of collective rational or socio-organisation impetuses drive terrorism as an alternative. I exemplified this objection with the 9/11 assault and the person case of Choudhury. Thirdly, I refuted this objection for 3 causes: (1) terrorism is a statistically unsuccessful means to an finish; (2) it’s troublesome to discern a rationalist technique from its ideological tenets; (3) on a person degree, if terrorism is a rational pursuit for materials positive aspects, then extra individuals may need been terrorists. Lastly, I raised a second objection which argues that terrorists don’t want an ideology as a result of psychological circumstances, resembling narcissistic character dysfunction or psychosis, can, in some instances, be the only driver to radicalisation as an alternative. In response, I argued that this fails as a result of if there is no such thing as a overarching goal or function, then it’s not terrorism however illicit violence as an alternative. Altogether, this leads me to conclude that terrorists want an ideology.
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