Almost a billion people will vote between April 19 and June 1 to elect a new Lok Sabha, with the results coming out on June 4. The next 76 days will see intense campaigning with the news cycle being taken over completely by the elections. As the race begins, the outcome seems an obvious one — but Indian elections have thrown up surprises in the past, most notably in 2004, when a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government went into the polls expecting to win and lost. Still, 2024 is not 2004, the NDA under Narendra Modi is very different from the NDA under Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Congress in 2024 is a pale shadow of that in 2004, and regional parties in 2024 are not the force they were in 2004.
The biggest difference is the BJP itself, the current national political hegemon. Not since the Congress in its heyday in the 1960s has one party dominated the national political landscape the way the BJP has. The BJP under Narendra Modi and Amit Shah has shaped itself into an election-fighting machine that has shown the ability to grow organically as well as inorganically, forge alliances at will, and venture into new geographies. If the BJP wins again, Modi will become the first Prime Minister after Jawaharlal Nehru to return for a third consecutive term. The BJP has proved vulnerable in state elections — since May 2014, it has lost 31 of the 62 elections — but its repeated success in national elections (it improved its 2014 performance in 2019, and has set itself the target of significantly improving its numbers again in 2024) shows that the electorate believes the party is best equipped to run India even if it isn’t the best equipped to run a particular province.
Behind the BJP’s success has been its ability to grow its electoral base. Four factors have helped it do so. First, the BJP-led government’s ability to solve what can be called first-generation problems — the provision of basic services such as piped water, sanitation, and power. Second, its effective and efficient welfare schemes. Third, the broader and more inclusive Hindutva narrative it has built, one that appeals to Hindus among the other backward classes and Scheduled Castes. The BJP’s success in building such a base has meant that it wins around (or over) 50% of the vote in some constituencies — data from recent elections clearly illustrates that — making it difficult for the Opposition, fragmented or united. And fourth, Narendra Modi, who is the strongest and biggest political brand in the country today (by a distance). Combined with the machinery at its disposal, these have even helped the BJP grow in new markets. West Bengal, circa 2019, is a case in point. And, likely in terms of vote share, Tamil Nadu in 2024 may see something similar, although Modi, south of the Vindhyas, isn’t the same brand he is north of it.
The only national Opposition to the BJP remains the Congress. In 2019, it won around a fifth of the vote, which means 119.5 million Indians voted for it, and in many states, it is engaged in a straight contest with the BJP. But the party, now in power in only three Indian states, one in the extreme North, and two in the South, has not managed to rebuild itself after its poor showing in the national elections in 2014 and 2019. Much of its effort in the past year has been around the Bharat Jodo Yatra led by Rahul Gandhi. If, as the party claims, this march (its second phase is ongoing) is not aimed at electoral success, then one wonders what the larger point is. And if, as it does seem to be, the march is actually a political and electoral exercise, its effectiveness is suspect.
As for regional parties, even those rabidly opposed to the BJP may end up seriously considering partnering with it. After all, their own turf is secure (because the BJP can be defeated in state elections); and having a good relationship with the Union government may mean governors who aren’t obstructionist, help with finances, and large, centrally funded infrastructure projects. Some of them also compete with the Congress at the state level, making a partnership difficult.
The task of the Congress and the regional parties has been made more difficult by the fact that there does not appear to be a large national issue on which they can challenge the incumbent. In 2004, widespread rural and agrarian distress helped the Opposition put one over the NDA. Last year, Opposition parties seemed to suggest a renewed focus on social justice could be the big issue in the 2024 elections, and some followed through with caste surveys and censuses. But the sun may have set on the political utility of social justice — which means a repeat of the 1990s when Mandal (social justice) held Kamandal (Hindutva) at bay, is unlikely.
This means the contest could end up being a straight referendum on the NDA government’s track record — and the ability of the BJP and the Opposition to spin this to their advantage.
