This can be a preprint excerpt from Mongolian Independence and the British: Geopolitics and Diplomacy in Excessive Asia, 1911–1916, by Matteo Miele. You possibly can obtain the e book freed from cost from E-Worldwide Relations.
The present Mongolian state (Mongol uls) covers over one and a half million sq. kilometers with a inhabitants, in 2020, of simply over three million inhabitants.[1] Geographically, nevertheless, the nation represents solely part of the broader nationwide and cultural identification of the Buddhist Mongols, who’re additionally current within the Folks’s Republic of China, particularly within the Autonomous Area of Internal Mongolia. One other historical presence, though numerically very restricted, is represented by the Mongols of Hsin-chiang.[2] Nonetheless others stay in Russia, particularly in Buryatia and Kalmykia. The Mongols of Kalmykia moved from Zungaria within the seventeenth century. Kalmykia remained a khanate till 1771, when many Mongols returned to Zungaria and the nation was absolutely built-in into Russia by Catherine II.[3]
Within the historic evaluation of British geopolitical designs of the early twentieth century, Outer Mongolia – apparently – ought to have a peripheral function. The nation was too removed from the geographic coronary heart of Britain’s pursuits in Asia. Certainly, these pursuits traveled the routes of the Indian Ocean and, via the very important Strait of Malacca and due to this fact Singapore, arrived in southern China, the place the British imperial custom was embodied within the colony of Hong Kong. The industrial dimension of a rustic with one of many lowest inhabitants densities on the planet was actually negligible: in 1920, shortly after the interval examined on this analysis, the full inhabitants was estimated between two and 5 million inhabitants over the complete Mongolian territory (Internal and Outer Mongolia).[4] The 1950 knowledge, that could be a few tens of years after the interval analyzed by this work, consult with a complete inhabitants of about 780,000 inhabitants in unbiased Mongolia alone.[5] Even relating to the protection of India – from a strategic perspective – the geographical place of Mongolia was secondary.
But, as I’ll attempt to clarify, Outer Mongolia, free of the yoke of the Ch’ing Empire, reopened the geopolitical confrontation of Nice Britain and Russia in Excessive Asia, significantly in Tibet, though the earlier years had witnessed the event of worldwide relations that had positioned the UK and Russia on the identical aspect. ‘Russian motion in Mongolia doesn’t, I think about, instantly concern Nice Britain, however not directly it’s of very nice consequence certainly’ defined George Ernest Morrison, an ex-correspondent from Peking for The Occasions and an adviser to Yüan Shih-k’ai, writing to Dudley D. Braham, in February 1913.[6]
Then in what phrases can we converse of a brand new geopolitical confrontation? Most likely an additional evaluation must be added to the then framework of worldwide relations, to elucidate the significance of a area so removed from Calcutta and Delhi. Mongolia – as has already been seen – was (and is) strongly linked to Tibet by cultural and non secular ties. Modifications in Urga had totally different penalties on the relations of the Western powers with Lhasa. Considering by way of historic and geopolitical evaluation essentially means putting a rustic in its personal geographical and cultural context. The outline made by the Italian orientalist Alessandro Bausani on the centrality of the non secular factor (even in a textual content devoted to Persia) may be very efficient:
In nice conventional civilizations […] the totally different cultural parts interweave; artwork and faith, regulation and politics will not be items of a mosaic however are carefully blended right into a single organism dominated and permeated by an important of all motifs, faith.[7]
Such a discourse is much more legitimate for nations the place non secular hierarchies, over the centuries, assumed a pre-eminent place to the purpose of coinciding with the very thought of political energy and established a theocracy. Lhasa was, from this perspective, the non secular and consequently political heart for a Tibetan Buddhist area that met with British goals. As Charles Bell wrote in 1924: ‘race and faith are the strongest of ties, particularly within the East’.[8] Add to this the return of the dalai lama to Lhasa and the declaration of independence of Tibet in 1913. The top – and fragmentation – of the Ch’ing Empire was the novelty that intervened in these areas on the problems outlined by the Anglo-Russian Conference in 1907. Walter Langley, assistant under-secretary of state for International Affairs,[9] wrote to the India Workplace in March 1913 on this regard:
Current data from Peking and India has tended to substantiate the impression that a big enhance of Russian affect in Thibet is to be apprehended within the close to future, whereas the course of occasions since 1907, culminating within the sensible acquisition of independence by the Thibetans, and within the conclusion of treaties by Mongolia with Russia and Thibet respectively, would appear to have distinctly altered the established order in Thibet, and each Russian and British relations in the direction of that nation.[10]
Due to this fact, Mongolian independence reopened, within the British view, the sport: that nation might grow to be the important thing to open the doorways of Lhasa to the Russians. The British additionally feared, for instance, the numerous Mongolian monks who moved to Tibetan monasteries.[11] Russian weapons had been in all probability despatched to Tibet by the Mongols.[12] Allow us to due to this fact proceed so as, thus highlighting the historical-political path of unbiased Outer Mongolia and the dimension that it assumed within the geopolitical pursuits of the British Empire.
Mongolian independence
In Tibet, the thirteenth dalai lama declared independence – as seen – at the start of 1913. In Outer Mongolia, independence had been declared even earlier than the official finish of the empire, in December 1911. The chief of the Yellow Faculty in Mongolia was the khal-kha rje-btsun dam-pa, in Mongolian: bogd jivzundamba hutagt haan bogd jivzundamba hutagt haan. Hutagt (Tibetan: ho thog tu), in Chinese language: hu-t’u-k’o-t’u 呼圖克圖, is a title reserved for the very best leaders of Tibetan Buddhism.[13] Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma-bstan-’dzin-dbang-phyug, Tibetan by beginning, was the eighth in a sprul sku line that’s traced again to the seventeenth century, to Blo-bzang-bstan-pa’i-rgyal-mtshan (1635-1723), son of a Halh prince, Gombodorj.[14] Within the sequence of what had been thought-about «manifestations» of Bde-mchog, along with the rje-btsun dam-pa, the jo-nang grasp Tā-ra-nā-tha (1575-1634), who died in Mongolia in 1634: the primary rje-btsun dam-pa Blo-bzang-bstan-pa’i-rgyal-mtshan, additionally known as Zanabazar, was considered his subsequent rebirth by the dalai lama and paṇ-chen bla-ma.[15] Zanabazar can also be remembered for his extraordinary inventive work and for having created the «soyombo» scripture, whose first grapheme, additionally known as «soyombo», turned since 1911 one of many primary symbols of independence and Mongolian identification, even throughout the communist interval, and continues to be – amongst different issues – on the flag and within the nationwide emblem of the present Republic.[16] The Mongolian capital was initially a monastery for Zanabazar based in 1639.[17]
On December 1, there was the formal declaration and some weeks later – on December 29 – the eighth rje-btsun dam-pa Ngag-dbang-blo-bzang-chos-kyi-nyi-ma-bstan-’dzin-dbang-phyug ascended the throne as bogd haan.[18] His authorities was made up of 5 ministries: inside affairs, international affairs, army affairs, justice and finance.[19] The ministers had been Tserenchimed (Inside Affairs), Handdorj (International Affairs), Namsray (Justice), Gombosüren (Navy Affairs), and Chagdaryaj (Finance).[20] The identify Ih Mongol Uls was resurrected by some Mongolian historians, thus underlining the hyperlink of the brand new nation with the traditional medieval empire created by Chingis haan.[21] The Chinese language troopers in Mongolia, unpaid due to the revolution, mutinied.[22] The hyperlink between the Manchu dynasty and the Mongols was to be thought-about dissolved and there was, in line with the Mongols, no continuation of this hyperlink to the Republic of China that was about to be born.[23] In 1688 the Halh princes had requested the Manchu Emperor Okay’ang-hsi for cover towards Galdan, the haan of the Oyrat Mongols, who was later defeated in 1690.[24] In 1691, the princes due to this fact acknowledged the emperor’s authority.[25] As with Tibet later, that recognition didn’t indicate the total annexation to China; the bond was a relationship between emperor and princes, and never between Mongolia and China. Certainly, in line with Luciano Petech:
Il vassallaggio accettato nel 1691 dai principi Qalqa della Mongolia Esterna period un rapporto personale fra di essi e la dinastia manciù. Durante i secoli XVIII e XIX i capi mongoli obbedirono all’imperatore manciù come avevano obbedito e pagato tributo al loro qa’an. Dal 1719 fu loro vietato di avere rapporti diretti con le potenze straniere. Ciò voleva dire che le relazioni col vicino russo venivano trattate dal governo di Pechino. Queste relazioni vennero poi regolate col trattato di Kiakhta del 1860. Gli imperatori in linea di massima non intervennero negli affari del paese, rispettando tutti i diritti dell’aristocrazia mongola.[26]
Solely from the start of the 20th century, from 1902 to be exact, did the Ch’ing dynasty authorize the Chinese language (Han) colonization of Outer Mongolia, which had been banned earlier than then.[27] Even in Mongolia, as seen for Tibet, the «New Coverage» (新政 hsin cheng), inaugurated in 1901, was carried out.[28] In 1906, a Bureau for the Colonization of Mongolia was born.[29] Due to this fact, colonization, on the time of independence, was nonetheless simply starting and the Chinese language had settled solely within the fertile valley between Urga and Kyakhta.[30] To encourage the sinization there was additionally the motion of Sando (in Chinese language 三多 San-to), the final amban of Urga, who – nonetheless in 1911 – had opened one other bureau for colonization.[31] Sando, an anti-Russian, had arrived in Urga in March 1910.[32] Actually his administration of energy, his harshness and disrespect in the direction of the Mongols – regardless of being of Mongolian origin himself[33] –in addition to his greed to tax the inhabitants, had contributed enormously to the tip of the centuries-old bond with the Ch’ing. Certainly, in line with T. A. Rustad, a Norwegian who labored for the British and American Tobacco Firm:
The mongols have gotten horses that yearly they dedicate to the Residing-God. These horses are introduced into Urga throughout the summer time pageant, when horse-racing and many others takes place. Effectively the Amban along with his troopers took these horses by drive from the mongols and branded them along with his personal model saying that they had been for use solely by the military hereafter. Effectively you possibly can think about what impact that had on the mongols, who’re very non secular, of their manner. The amban taxed each little bit that the mongols produced and wanted. The constructing of the barraks close to Urga, nearly 3 miles to the East of the city was additionally achieved with mongol cash. There have been some nice timber in a sure valley close to Urga that the mongols thought quite a lot of. Effectively the very first thing the Amban did was to chop down these timber and use them within the barrack buildings. The Amban in reality did every little thing that he knew the Mongols didn’t like. He sat on them, correctly talking. Handled them similar to animals, not in addition to he handled his personal overfed ponies. The mongols are very peaceable individuals, however this was greater than any human being might stand. People who had any valuables had been put in jail and what that they had was taken away from them. I’ve heard hundred of tales of how he managed to get what that they had […]. Effectively the behaviour of the Amban was the reason for the Mongol rising towards the federal government of China. [34]
G. E. Morrison merely accused the 2 excessive imperial officers of the cruelty in Mongolia (by Sando) and in Tibet (by Chang Yin-t’ang); briefly, in line with him, it was merely a matter of non-public duty, as if there had not been a broader plan of colonization and whole submission of territories for hundreds of years utterly autonomous from the central imperial energy.[35] Morrison’s opinion should clearly be filtered and understood in his function as adviser to Yüan Shih-k’ai. The British ambassador Jordan didn’t have nice sympathy in the direction of the adviser, contemplating him – in line with Morrison himself – basically Chinese language (‘My chief issue is the hostility of Sir John Jordan who seems to treat me as a Chinese language’).[36]
In Internal Mongolia, Han colonization had begun as early as 1840.[37] By 1913, there have been 82,000 Chinese language within the district of T’ao-nan 洮南, whereas Mongols had been simply 23,000.[38] Sinization, nevertheless, meant not solely colonization within the lands of the Mongols, but additionally and above all a cultural and social course of, a radical change within the conventional way of life, since one of many basic traces of demarcation between Chinese language and Mongols was the nomadic way of life: of the 23,000 Mongols within the district of T’ao-nan, 4,000 had grow to be farmers.[39] Moreover, the Mongols had been faraway from the fertile lands – which the Chinese language saved for themselves – and solely the arid highlands remained to lift their livestock.[40] With loans at usury charges, the Mongolian tribes had been dropping land and livestock to the newcomers[41] and on the identical time the Mongols’ hatred of the Chinese language was fueled.[42] The Chinese language authorities additionally banned the Mongols from acquiring loans from the Russians.[43] Mainly, the try by the Chinese language was to make Mongolia a Chinese language province in all respects. Comparable initiatives additionally concerned Tibet. Certainly, Wen Tsung-yao 溫宗堯, after his removing from the publish of junior amban of Lhasa in 1910,[44] ready a plan for Tibet for the sensible transformation of Tibet right into a Chinese language province, though not formally calling it in that manner: ‘不必遽改為行省，而當以治行省之道治之’. [45] It’s helpful to recollect, on this regard, that even in the present day outer Tibet and inside Mongolia will not be formally «provinces» (省 sheng) of the Folks’s Republic of China, however «autonomous areas» (tzu chih ch’ü 自治區 / 自治区).
The Russians and Mongolia
Within the days following the Mongol declaration of independence in 1911, the function of Russia was additionally being determined. In 1854, on the top of the Revolt of the T’ai-p’ing, sure of the tip of the Ch’ing dynasty, Nikolay Murav’yëv-Amurskiy (1809-1881) had defined to the Russian authorities the necessity to keep away from Chinese language dominion over Mongolia after the tip of the Manchu rule.[46] On the time, Murav’yëv-Amurskiy was the Governor Basic of Japanese Siberia.[47] Within the seventeenth century the Russians had despatched a number of missions to the Mongols with the goal of convincing the princes to acknowledge the tsar’s authority, with out, nevertheless, acquiring actual outcomes, with the exception – maybe – of Altan han Ombo Erdene.[48] The difficulties elevated within the second half of the seventeenth century, with border incidents and Mongolian incursions into Siberia.[49] Solely in 1689, below the strain of Chinese language troops, did the Treaty of Nerchinsk set up the border between the 2 empires alongside the Argun’ and Shilka rivers and the Stanovoy mountain vary, excluding the Russians from the Amur area.[50] Between 1858 and 1860, different treaties prolonged the borders of the Russian Empire on the expense of the Ch’ing empire, in the direction of Central Asia and the areas of Amur, Priamur’ye and Ussuri.[51] The hero of the conquest of the brand new territories was exactly Murav’yëv-Amurskiy.[52] His 1854 proposal on Mongolia had received some favor within the authorities; a particular fee had espoused his final objective to increase Russian affect over Mongolia, albeit in a peaceable manner.[53] The Russian warning, nevertheless, a couple of doable subjugation of Mongolia and Manchuria, as protectorates, stemmed from a doable Western response: in response, different powers might annex different territories – for instance Korea – as defined by the Amur Fee to the tsar in 1861.[54] The next yr, nevertheless, the identical fee expressed its favor, within the occasion of the autumn of the Ch’ing dynasty, for the independence of Mongolia and Manchuria, thus clarifying the following Russian coverage on the problem.[55]
On January 11, 1912, with an official communiqué, Saint Petersburg responded positively to the request of the Chinese language and Mongols for mediation, however positioned as a precondition the absence of Chinese language officers, troopers or settlers in Mongolia.[56] Naturally, the Chinese language, for his or her half, had requested for Russian assist with the goal of averting the total independence of the nation.[57] The Russians might attempt to persuade the Mongols to not completely abandon their ties with China, however within the occasion of full independence, Saint Petersburg needed to set up enterprise relations with Mongolia, given the nation’s industrial pursuits.[58] Sergey Sazonov, Russian international minister, nevertheless, instantly defined to the Chinese language ambassador in Saint Petersburg that the communiqué didn’t imply a Russian try and annex Mongolia, however solely to make sure actual autonomy for the Mongols.[59] On the identical time Sazonov informed Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador to Saint Petersburg, that Russia didn’t wish to set up a protectorate over Urga.[60] Certainly, to such a proposal, beforehand made by some Mongol princes, Russia had already given a detrimental reply.[61] Shchekin, the Russian chargé d’affaires in China, additionally informed Jordan that the one Russian objective was the autonomy of Mongolia and never independence.[62]
Mongolian army actions in 1912
On January 15, 1912, the Mongols had occupied the Chinese language metropolis of Haylaar (Hai-la-erh 海拉爾), in Manchuria – in the present day within the Autonomous Area of Internal Mongolia, close to the Russian border – put the tao-t’ai on the run and likewise proclaimed the independence of the border space between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, between Haylaar and Man-chou-li 滿洲里.[63] The truth is, the autumn of the Chinese language metropolis of Haylaar was adopted by a march to the west which noticed the assault on the Dalai nuur.[64] On February 2, the Chinese language sector of Man-chou-li was attacked.[65] The Mongol army successes involved cities in the present day in Chinese language territory, within the Autonomous Area of Internal Mongolia.
The collapse of Manchu imperial energy, with the Chinese language troops who – as talked about above – had mutinied and had been now devoted to banditry, essentially needed to push the Russians to behave on to protect their industrial pursuits.[66] In response to Henry Edward Sly, the British consul in Harbin,[67] the Russians themselves pushed the Mongols to intervene in Manchuria.[68] And really a number of clues supported that concept. The formal neutrality of the Russians, invoked by the Chinese language and Mongols as mediators to resolve the disaster, was contradicted by the Russian weapons utilized by the Mongols of their operations in Manchuria and the bullets discovered on the bottom had been additionally Russian.[69] Saint Petersburg formally acknowledged the legitimacy of Chinese language claims on the area simply conquered by the Mongols in Manchuria.[70] Within the meantime, nevertheless, earlier than attacking the Chinese language sector of Man-chou-li, the Mongols had been within the metropolis’s Russian barracks and returned there after the operation.[71] Moreover, the physique of a Russian officer had been discovered on Chinese language territory.[72] There have been, due to this fact, and not using a shadow of a doubt, direct actions by the Russian authorities within the space, actions that Konovalov, former head of the Imperial Maritime Customs at Harbin, in a dialog along with his outdated pal Sly, had dismissed as ‘blunders’.[73] Basic Martinov had given the order and on the finish of March 1912 he alone was thought-about accountable and due to this fact punished.[74] Mainly, as Jordan wrote to Gray,
it could seem that Basic Martinof, in control of the Chinese language Japanese Railway Guards, has been made the scapegoat for what M. Konovalof described as a “ blunder ” on the a part of the Russian authorities on this event.[75]
Certainly, the world of the Mongol assaults was additionally positioned inside the largest Russian sphere of affect that Saint Petersburg had agreed with Tokyo within the aforementioned secret conference of 1907, later confirmed in one other secret settlement of 1910.[76]
In the meantime, in line with a memorandum drawn up by the army attaché of the British Embassy in Peking despatched by Sir John Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, in August 1912,[77] within the district of T’ao-nan 洮南, there had been an rebellion of part of the japanese Mongolian tribes and people tribes then moved in the direction of Ch’ih-feng 赤峰 (in Mongolian: Ulaanhad), within the province of Chih-li,[78] inflicting some skirmishes between the Chinese language and the Mongols the next winter.[79] The ‘Talikangai’ district was occupied by a thousand Mongols from japanese Mongolia (south of Haylaar) who had left Urga on the finish of January and by one other 600 from the capital of Outer Mongolia, who additionally had left on the finish of January and had been properly acquired by the Mongolian inhabitants of the district.[80] The thousand individuals from japanese Mongolia had been really below the orders of a raider who had helped the Russians within the Russo-Japanese battle.[81] These troopers had been to be joined by 4 thousand males from Uliastay (in the present day within the Republic of Mongolia), who additionally gathered in Urga earlier than continuing to Talikangai in February.[82]
In response to the assaults, the Chinese language had strengthened the garrisons alongside the Mongolian border, for a complete of between 30 and 40,000 troopers.[83] Half of those (15-20,000 troopers), below the command of the Navy Governor of Jehol, had been positioned within the north-east, from Jehol[84] to the borders of Internal Mongolia and Manchuria.[85] Between 10 and 12,000 males as a substitute defended the territory that went from Doloon nuur in the direction of the southwest, as much as Haalgan[86] and the prefecture (fu 府) of Ta-t’ung 大同,[87] and had been below the command of the army governor of Haalgan.[88] The remaining 5 or 6,000 males had been positioned inside a radius of fifty miles across the metropolis of Kuei-hua-ch’eng 歸化城 and had been taking orders from the army governor of that metropolis.[89]
These garrisons had been principally composed of lower than 500 troopers, due to this fact uncovered to the violence of the nomads.[90] These few males needed to face the quick Mongolian gangs, capable of journey, with camels, 30 miles a day and with out issue in acquiring horses and provisions.[91] For weapons, however, the Mongols clearly relied on the Russians; it appeared that the Mongol deputation in Saint Petersburg had ordered, in 1911, 5,000 outdated sample rifles, 500 of which had been delivered to Urga in 1912[92] and the Russians had all the time provided three batteries of quick-firing weapons and twenty machine weapons.[93]
The Russo-Mongol settlement of November 3, 1912 and the Mongolian delegation in Saint Petersburg
On November 3, 1912 (October 21 of the Russian calendar) Russia and Mongolia signed an settlement of friendship and commerce in Urga.[94] The French translation of the textual content, based mostly on the Chinese language model and printed in H. Triepel, Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit worldwide, Troisiéme Série, Tome VII, Leipzig 1913, states that:
Pour permettre à la Mongolie de conserver sa state of affairs actuelle d’indépendance, la Mongolie a le droit de former une armée nationale, et le gouvernement chinois ne pourra envoyer en Mongolie ni soldats ni colons.
Anyway, in line with the German translation of the Russian textual content printed in the identical e book:
Die kaiserlich russische Regierung erweist der Mongolei ihre Hilfe bei der Aufrechterhaltung der von ihr eingeführten autonomen Ordnung wie auch des Rechts, ihr nationales Heer zu unterhalten und nicht zuzulassen, dass ihr Territorium von chinesischen Truppen betreten und von Chinesen kolonisiert werde.
Russia thus acknowledged Mongolia – though its independence was acknowledged solely in Chinese language – and likewise assured itself a protracted sequence of rights and privileges geared toward strengthening its political, financial and industrial function, in addition to the standing of most favored nation in Mongolia. The truth is, the second level of the doc reads: ‘Aucune puissance ne peut avoir en Mongolie des droits et privilèges plus grands que ceux des Russes’. Moreover, in line with the third level:
Si le gouvernement mongol estime nécessaire de faire un traité avec le gouvernement chinois ou un autre gouvernement étranger, ce traité devra d’abord être approuvé par la Russie et rien, dans ce traité, ne pourra être en opposition avec le présent traité.
Moreover, as seen, in line with the German translation of the Russian textual content, Russia was instantly dedicated to the safety of Mongolian autonomy.
A couple of weeks after the settlement, in January 1913, a Mongolian delegation of sixteen went to Saint Petersburg as an indication of gratitude for the Russian recognition of independence.[95] The mission was led by Handdorj, the Mongolian international minister,[96] a pro-Russian man, and was accompanied by Yakov Parfent’yevich Shishmarëv, the Russian consul-general in Urga.[97] Additionally Tserenchimed – who held the publish of minister of the inside[98] – and Haysan Bayantömöriyn joined the mission.[99] On January 23 the delegation was acquired by the tsar in Tsarskoye Selo and the following day by the minister of warfare, Basic Vladimir Sukhomlinov, to whom the Mongolian representatives requested for contemporary weapons and instructors to defend themselves from the Chinese language, acquiring constructive responses from each Sukhomlinov and the tsar.[100] The place of the Mongols with respect to the extent of their territories was totally different from that of Nice Britain and Russia. In a dialog with the editor of the Russian newspaper Novoye Vremya, printed on January 31, 1913, the members of the delegation argued that their thought of Mongolia coincided with all of the lands inhabited by Mongols and, due to this fact, additionally Internal Mongolia needed to fall below the authority of the brand new state and the duty of the mission was additionally to steer the Russians on this level.[101] Nevertheless, the Mongols had not answered the query of whether or not they had succeeded.[102]
The Mongols additionally requested for a gathering with the ambassadors of France and Nice Britain, allies of Russia within the Triple Entente, however not with these of Germany and Austria-Hungary, stunning Sazonov with their information of European affairs.[103] Each the British and French ambassadors, nevertheless, declined the invitation.[104] On the heart, after all, was the query of the popularity of Mongolian independence, to which the British most popular the phrase ‘autonomy’ below the Chinese language suzerainty.[105] This place was formally shared by Sazonov in his conversations with the British ambassador, citing, as a proof of the Mongolian claims, the dearth of distinction, within the Mongolian language, between the time period «autonomy» and the time period «independence».[106] Mongolia had requested Nice Britain to acknowledge its independence and to enter right into a commerce treaty with a letter from the Mongolian International Board addressed to the International Workplace and delivered to the British consulate in Harbin on December 13, 1912.[107] The letter formally introduced that the bogd haan was now the monarch of the nation.[108] ‘I don’t suggest that any reply must be made to this communication’ had written Edward Gray to Buchanan in Saint Petersburg.[109] The Mongolian international minister had additionally approached Yüan Shih-k’ai’s Political Advisor Morrison to have the deal with of the British diplomat Charles William Campbell in London to assist him get hold of London’s recognition and likewise to rent Campbell himself as an advisor.[110]
A doubt relating to the consequences of independence was associated to the financial results. It was not clear at this level of the standing of British rights with respect to Outer Mongolia. The nation’s independence had not but been acknowledged by the UK, nor after all by the newly fashioned Republic of China.[111] The British Board of Commerce due to this fact questioned whether or not the rights acquired by the earlier treaties signed with China must be thought-about unaltered, contemplating Outer Mongolia nonetheless as a part of the Republic.[112] Alongside the problem of Mongolia’s worldwide standing, the British refusal to satisfy the delegation was defined by not desirous to create pointless misunderstandings with Russia relating to British pursuits within the area,[113] however this facet will likely be analyzed extra fastidiously later. The financial and industrial query was secondary; there was as a substitute a political and geopolitical level, a broader studying of the Mongolian query for the pursuits of the British Empire in Tibet. The mission in Saint Petersburg led to March, after acquiring an settlement for the Russian provide of ammunition for the Mongolian military.[114]
The Tibetan-Mongolian mutual recognition and the Tibetan delegation in Saint Petersburg
On January 17, 1913, the Russian international minister delivered to George Buchanan a memorandum about an settlement, signed within the identify of the dalai lama by Dorzhiyev, with which Urga and Lhasa mutually acknowledged their independence from Peking.[115] The copy of this treaty was then delivered by the Russian authorities to Buchanan along with a dispatch from the Russian precise state councillor in Urga, Ivan Yakovlevich Korostovets.[116] The treaty was signed in Urga on January 11, 1913.[117] The 1912 Treaty with Russia was taken as a mannequin for the Tibetan-Mongolian treaty.[118] The treaty consisted of simply 9 articles. Within the first two articles the 2 rulers mutually acknowledged and permitted the creation of the 2 states. Article 3, however, supplied for cooperation between Urga and Lhasa in favor of Buddhism, whereas Article 4 ensured mutual assist towards exterior and inside risks. Article 5 assured assist for vacationers from one nation to a different, whether or not they had been pilgrims or on a state go to. Article 6 assured the continuation of mutual industrial relations in addition to the openings of commercial vegetation.
By signing this treaty, each nations, due to this fact, overtly rejected the idea of Chinese language suzerainty, and reaffirmed their full independence in issues of international coverage. Within the preamble, Lhasa and Urga made clear to the world their liberation from the Manchu yoke, but additionally their separation from China. Western diplomats of the time expressed a number of doubts concerning the validity of the treaty: to start with, there was no formal authorization of Dorzhiyev – a Buryat and topic of the tsar – to signal a treaty within the identify of the sovereign of Tibet.[119] Sazonov doubted that Dorzhiyev was legitimated on this sense[120] and Korostovets himself, in his dispatch from Urga, thought-about the signatories missing authorized authority, denying the treaty validity by way of worldwide regulation, however nonetheless recognizing its substance and likewise the usefulness of the settlement: China now needed to witness the rapprochement between two leaders whose personal relationship had been significantly troublesome prior to now.[121] The truth is, evidently the rje-btsun dam-pa didn’t like the recognition of the dalai lama throughout his keep in Mongolia. In response to Zhwa-sgab-pa-dbang-phyug-bde-ldan, the rje-btsun dam-pa offended Thub-bstan-rgya-mtsho on numerous events, even forcing him to vary his residence.[122] The dalai lama himself criticized the rje-btsun dam-pa within the assembly held in Peking with the prince of Sikkim, Srid-skyong-sprul-sku-rnam-rgyal.[123] One other attention-grabbing description comes from a report written by A. Rose, of the Embassy in Peking, after the dialog with Frans August Larson. [124] On March 10, 1913, Jordan despatched the report back to Sir Edward Gray. [125] The bogd haan
is described as a weak man, nearly all the time intoxicated with the champagne which he obtains from France, proudly owning a modern-furnished and opulent palace, however preferring to sit down on the carpets of his tent.
He was extremely revered by lay and non secular. He had a spouse: Dondogdulam. A. Rose wrote:
Larson describes her as a vigorous lady, with robust enterprise instincts, and two retailers of her personal in Urga. She has not solely induced the Lama Church to acknowledge her, however she has been granted the rank of a reincarnation, little, if any decrease than that of the Bogdo himself. Larson considers her as a determined issue within the state of affairs. It’s attention-grabbing to know that she is the advocate of the Chinese language trigger in Urga.
The report can also be attention-grabbing as an additional supply to see the army state of affairs. In response to the textual content, in Urga the Russians had been coaching two thousand Mongol troopers, 4 thousand had been the reservists, whereas within the metropolis there have been 600 Cossacks. The variety of Chinese language current in Haalgan was not clear: in line with some there have been 45,000 males, whereas Larson estimated them to be between ten and fifteen thousand. ‘The Commander-in-Chief of the Mongol military’ as a substitute it’s outlined as a ‘robber chief’, an aged opium addict who owed his reputation to raids throughout the Russo-Japanese Struggle.
Formally, additionally for the British authorities ‘within the absence of proof as to the authorized rights of the signatories,’ the Tibetan-Mongolian settlement ‘doesn’t possess any political significance’.[126] Nevertheless, Dorzhiyev had personally defined to Korostovets that the treaty was an thought of the dalai lama himself.[127] On February 10, 1913, the British ambassador to Peking, Sir John Jordan, communicated to Sir Edward Gray that
[i]t seems that the Dalai Lama took the initiative in negotiating this compact which formally declares the separation from China and the independence of Thibet and Mongolia. The 2 States comply with uphold the Buddhist faith and to help one another towards exterior or inside risks.[128]
Feeling uncertain, on March 9, 1913, the Authorities of India wrote to the secretary of state for India, Robert Crewe-Milnes:
We predict that, whereas we’re ready for textual content of settlement, political officer in Sikkim must be instructed to write down to Dalai Lama informing him that His Majesty’s Authorities, having heard a report that the settlement has been concluded, want to know whether or not it was authorised by his Holiness, and, if that’s the case, what are the phrases of the settlement.[129]
The political agent in Sikkim on the time was Charles Alfred Bell who, due to this fact, despatched a communication of the British commerce agent, the Anglo-Sikkimese[130] David Macdonald, in line with whose sources, the dalai lama had not really approved to signal a treaty between the 2 nations:[131]
I’ve the honour to state that the first-named particular person “ Ku-char Tsan-shib Khen-chen Lob-sang Ngak-wang ” is the infamous Buriat Dorjieff.
2. The second-named particular person “ Dro-nyer Ngak-wang Chho-dzin ” has been stationed at Urga to take care of the numerous Thibetans who’re residing there.
3. The third particular person “ Ye-she-gyam-tso ” is a monk official who’s accountable for the financial institution belonging to the Dalai Lama at Urga.
4. The fourth particular person “ Gen-dün-gyal-tsan ” is a clerk to Ye-she-gyam-tso.
5. I be taught on good authority, that the Dalai Lama has not authorised the above-named individuals to signal a treaty between Thibet and Mongolia. Thibetans declare that the Mongolians are the disciples of his Holiness the Dalai Lama and his Serenity the Tashi Lama and profess the Buddhist faith. The Dalai Lama when visiting Mongolia based the financial institution and appointed the individuals above-named.[132]
On the identical time, nevertheless, Charles Alfred Bell wrote to the Authorities of India:
Mr. Macdonald thinks that the Dalai Lama has not authorised the so-called plenipotentiaries on behalf of Thibet to signal the settlement. Nevertheless, this can be, there could be little question that such an settlement can be welcome to the Dalai Lama within the current place of affairs.[133]
Actually, on the International Workplace, nevertheless, the treaty not solely couldn’t be ignored, however was thought-about a truth, the concrete doc that overtly linked – through Mongolia – Lhasa and Saint Petersburg:
Current data from Peking and India has tended to substantiate the impression that a big enhance of Russian affect in Thibet is to be apprehended within the close to future, whereas the course of occasions since 1907, culminating within the sensible acquisition of independence by the Thibetans, and within the conclusion of treaties by Mongolia with Russia and Thibet respectively, would appear to have distinctly altered the established order in Thibet, and each Russian and British relations in the direction of that nation.[134]
As Alex McKay rightly writes: ‘The Tibet-Mongol treaty was one among many modern elements which indicated that the adjustments in Tibet required new worldwide agreements’.[135] In Morrison’s aforementioned letter to Dudley D. Braham of February 1913, Yüan Shih-k’ai’s adviser wrote concerning the positions of Saint Petersburg and London with respect to the treaty between Urga and Lhasa:
Russian motion in Mongolia doesn’t, I think about, instantly concern Nice Britain, however not directly it’s of very nice consequence certainly, for it’s essential to keep in mind that Mongols who stay on the Mongolian border which borders on the province of Chihli and on the border of Manchuria have made it recognized, little question from motives, that Nice Britain and Russia are performing in accord in defending Mongolia and Tibet and that these two nice Nations are aware about the Mongolian Tibetan settlement. Statements made at uncommon intervals within the Home of Commons denying these options can do little to counteract the proof furnished by the Mongols themselves.[136]
The Russians took two paths to increase their affect over Tibet. Firstly, Russian weapons had been provided to the Tibetans to assist repel the Chinese language invasion within the final interval of the Ch’ing dynasty.[137] In response to Charles Alfred Bell:
It’s also indubitable that the settlement, if acted on, could show a supply of appreciable embarrassment to us, for Mongolian help below article 4 brings appreciably nearer the hazard of Russian intervention in Thibet.[138]
Secondly, the function of the Tibetan-Mongol non secular bond was basic. This connection was materially realized within the monasteries, the focal factors of the political, authorized, and financial system of Tibet. Certainly, in line with Sir Walter Langley:
The monastic affect is being exerted much more energetically, the similarity of non secular language and the solidarity and unity present between the monastic institutions in each nations enabling the Mongolian monks, who’re apparently migrating in giant numbers nowadays into Thibetan monasteries, to behave with appreciable impact because the apostles of Russian concepts and affect.[139]
With no Chinese language authority capable of handle Tibetan points formally (nevertheless utterly inefficient – as seen – on a sensible degree), even the part regarding Tibet of the Anglo-Russian settlement of 1907 was put into disaster. The collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty and the total independence of Tibet and Mongolia crumbled, within the Far East, the political substratum of what was established in 1907. As already seen within the earlier pages, the settlement had acknowledged Peking’s suzerainty over Lhasa, whereas the British and Russians needed to chorus from any interference within the inside administration of Tibet, along with the prohibition to ship their representatives to the capital or to aspire to any concessions. Contemplating what has been defined to this point, nevertheless, had been these impediments nonetheless working for Russia? It was mandatory for London to re-discuss the matter. The issue, nevertheless, was that – as we have now seen – the 1907 settlement was articulated via a sequence of mutual exchanges and delicate balances which additionally affected Persia and Afghanistan. Some provisions of the settlement had not but been carried out and moreover the Afghan emir Ḩabīballāh Khān had not acknowledged the Anglo-Russian Settlement.[140] Due to this fact it was essential to proceed with excessive warning with respect to a brand new negotiation on Tibet to keep away from a Russian counterproposal on Afghanistan.[141] Certainly, regardless of visiting India in early 1907, the emir of Afghanistan was not knowledgeable of the 1907 settlement till after the signing and this discourtesy – which the Viceroy of India, the Earl of Minto, had sought to keep away from – had led the emir to reject it.[142] The Russians, nevertheless, in 1908, had confirmed, via international minister Izvolskiy, the validity of the settlement, whatever the place of the emir.[143]
One strategy to go could possibly be to hyperlink the acceptance of the Russo-Mongol settlement of 1912 by the British Authorities to a redefinition of the agreements on Tibet, with out the Russian aspect asking for a ‘quid professional quo’:
Sir E. Gray would recommend, due to this fact, that in replying to the Russian Authorities’s request for a beneficial reception of the latest Russo-Mongolian Treaty, the entire state of affairs must be frankly laid earlier than them, and a dialogue invited of the bearing of this treaty upon the place of Thibet, however that in doing this His Majesty’s Authorities shouldn’t at first ask instantly for a revision of the conference, however ought to merely invite the Russian Authorities to a dialogue of the state of affairs within the hope that by so doing a request for a quid professional quo is perhaps averted.[144]
One other essential piece within the development of those new geopolitical balances in Asia was additionally the arrival in Saint Petersburg, in February 1913, shortly after the arrival of the Mongolian mission, of a Tibetan delegation, with presents for the tsar from the dalai lama.[145] Fifteen Tibetan boys who had been to review in Russian colleges additionally got here with the delegation.[146] Dorzhiyev’s objective, who arrived within the Russian capital earlier than the arrival of the remainder of the delegation, was to push Russia to behave as mediator between Lhasa and London, ‘the Thibetans being a lot incensed with England on the proposal made by her to China in regard to Thibet and the potential for a Chinese language protectorate’.[147] Dorzhiyev, nevertheless, was formally thought-about a topic of the tsar and, due to this fact, couldn’t, in line with the Russians, signify the dalai lama.[148] Moreover, the letter from the ruler of Tibet to the tsar, asking for the institution of an Anglo-Russian protectorate on the Land of the Snows, couldn’t be considered both by London or by Saint Petersburg as formally in distinction with the Anglo-Russian Settlement of 1907.[149]
Anyway, the earthquake triggered by the Hsin-hai Revolution had opened new eventualities that approved the British to maneuver diplomatically to attempt to redefine the order and stability of energy in Excessive Asia.
Urga to the Russians, Lhasa to the British
In September 1912 G. E. Morrison wrote to the editor of The Morning Submit, Howell Arthur Gwynne:
Look additionally on the manner the Authorities are performing in reference to Tibet. Main W. F. O’Connor, who was with Younghusband within the Tibetan Expedition, needs the publish of Consul Basic in Lhasa. I believe it could be a superb factor if we had been to have a Consul Basic in Lhasa. I’ve all the time thought so. Presumably Russia may also have a Consul Basic, every Consulate having an official guard of its personal Nationals. It might be a fantastic benefit to our status in Nepal and on the frontier of India to know that there’s a highly effective British escort stationed in Lhasa. Russia is at current working for the autonomy of Mongolia. Japan is working for the popularity of her particular rights in Manchuria. It has been an immense benefit to each Russia and Japan that England ought to seize this chance to intervene within the worldwide administration of Tibet. […] We’ve knowledgeable the Chinese language that we’ll not recognise the Republic except they’ve first signed with us an settlement relating to Tibet. We’ve thus satisfied each Chinese language that the coverage of Japan in Manchuria, and of Russia in Mongolia is the information of British coverage in Tibet. We’re to do in Tibet as these two pleasant powers are doing in Manchuria and in Mongolia.[150]
The true British concern, nevertheless, remained that of a Tibet below Russian management and the destiny of Mongolia alone was of little curiosity to London so far as this didn’t intervene with the protection of the northern border of the Raj. Gray himself had confided to the German ambassador in London, Paul Metternich, at the start of 1912, within the nonetheless poorly outlined moments of the beginning of the Republic of China, that if the Russians needed to rework Mongolia right into a buffer state between them and China, the British wished the identical for Tibet, though sustaining Chinese language suzerainty:
I stated that the Russians had lengthy wished Mongolia to be at the least semi-autonomous, and a type of buffer State between their territory and China correct. I didn’t assume that that they had departed from this coverage. As for Thibet, we weren’t interfering with it, although our want was much like the Russian want, as we must always wish to have Thibet as a buffer State below the suzerainty of China.[151]
However this concern of Mongolia as a springboard to Tibet existed: ‘The state of affairs is, in reality, similar to that of 1903’ defined the India Workplace in March 1913, with the notable distinction, nevertheless, of the brand new perspective, actually extra favorable to Britain, of the dalai lama, ‘now pleasant, or, in any respect occasions, not but overtly hostile’.[152] Independence, nevertheless, left Tibet on the mercy of one other energy and if the nation, as they wrote from the India Workplace to the International Workplace, ‘should be topic to some affect’, the one conceivable affect then was British affect.[153] Two totally different choices to realize that objective in relation to Mongolia had been outlined. On the one hand, there was the concept of Lord Crewe, secretary of state for India, who felt it mandatory to satisfy the Mongolian delegation in Saint Petersburg, ‘acquiring a footing in Mongolia which could show of nice worth in future dealings with the Russian Authorities’:
The Marquess of Crewe absolutely appreciates the final grounds of coverage on which His Majesty’s Ambassador was instructed in Sir E. Gray’s telegram No. 96 of the 4th February final to not obtain the Mission. However he would submit for the consideration of the Secretary of State for International Affairs that, by holding totally aloof at present juncture, His Majesty’s Authorities could lose a possibility, which might be unlikely to recur, of acquiring a footing in Mongolia which could show of nice worth in future dealings with the Russian Authorities. Stress was laid by Sir J. Jordan in his telegram No. 64 of the sixth March, 1913, on the shut connection of Mongolia with Thibet, and Lord Crewe can’t however concern that, if Russia and its topics come to take pleasure in by treaty or apply a predominating affect in Mongolia as in contrast with different international States and their topics, a revival of Russian affect in Thibet, which it has been the coverage of His Majesty’s Authorities for the final ten years to counteract, should inevitably comply with. [154]
The place of Gray was totally different. Not that there have been no clear openings on the Mongolian aspect to His British Majesty’s Authorities. The Mongolian prince Haysan Bayantömöriyn, in line with a letter despatched to Morrison and written by T. A. Rustad – a Norwegian in Mongolia on behalf of the British and American Tobacco Firm – noticed within the British the potential for limiting Russian pursuits.[155] In response to Rustad:
Hai-Shun-Gung is the one man of the brand new Mongol authorities that realy [sic] does something. The remainder of them simply drink and let issues go as they finest can, and leaves every little thing to Hai-Shun-Gung. He takes no wage and spends his personal cash. He needs the Mongols to be handled like human beings that’s all he works for he says. [156]
In 1912, as defined by Rustad, Haysan Bayantömöriyn had determined to lease his gold-rich territories to any firm that had the backing of the British authorities, in trade for under 10% of the income.[157] Mongolia was – and is – significantly wealthy from a mining perspective: the final amban had appeared for gold mines, however his consultants had been often positioned on the fallacious paths by the native guides.[158]
Extra realistically, nevertheless, the International Workplace realized that it was not doable to undermine the Russians from that place that they had been slowly constructing in Urga and, above all, the potential for competing for a industrial primacy appeared distinctly impracticable – regardless of the potential for an ‘equal industrial therapy’ – with Russia within the nation and thus attempt to restrict Russian affect on Tibet.[159] Due to this fact, the technique had to make use of the Russian function in Mongolia as a pretext ‘to justify any British motion that it could be fascinating to soak up Thibet’.[160] Already on November 16, 1912, due to this fact just a few days after the Russo-Mongol settlement, Jordan had written to Gray from Peking:
A chance of negotiating a revision of our Thibetan association with Russia would appear to be offered by the conclusion of the latest Russo-Mongolian Settlement, which has brought on a lot perturbation in China.[161]
Probably the most sufficient means, in line with the International Workplace, to achieve affect over Tibet was to cope with the Chinese language and Tibetans in India, maybe via Nepal, and never get misplaced in a useless race with Saint Petersburg within the Mongolian grassland.[162]
This explains the true dimension of the significance that Mongolia held for the destiny of the British Empire: a type of trade to peacefully redefine with the Russians what the 1907 Settlement had sanctioned so rigidly. Urga to the Russians and Lhasa to the British. Saint Petersburg was to not be confronted even on Mongolian territory, however a barter to be enforced on the diplomatic desk was way more advantageous for each. Because of this it was of nice significance to specify British lack of curiosity in Mongolia within the clearest manner: within the first place by refusing to satisfy the Mongolian delegation in Saint Petersburg, a gathering that may have solely fueled ‘the suspicion of Russia and the hostility of China with little or no compensating benefit’.[163] In brief, a less expensive and extra cheap political and diplomatic motion that had satisfied, with out too many issues, even Lord Crewe, who thus renounced the assembly between Buchanan and the delegation, glad to know that additionally Gray understood the significance of constant to exclude the Russians from the Land of Snows.[164]
The Simla convention, between 1913 and 1914, due to this fact, needed to reshape the standing of Tibet and on the identical time undermine, with due warning, the outcomes of the Anglo-Russian Settlement of 1907 relating to Lhasa. To do that it was due to this fact additionally mandatory to acquire Russian consent. On Might 23, 1913, Gray communicated to his ambassador in Saint Petersburg concerning the British resolution to succeed in an settlement with the Chinese language Tibetan governments on Tibet
I HAVE to tell your Excellency that His Majesty’s Authorities have determined to ask the Chinese language and Thibetan Governments to a joint convention in India with a view to arriving at a settlement of the Thibetan query. [165]
The objective was to have Peking and Lhasa acknowledge Chinese language suzerainty over Tibet and due to this fact the interior autonomy of the nation.[166] The British and Chinese language needed to pledge to respect territorial integrity and Peking couldn’t colonize Tibet or ship troopers to the Roof of the World, except not more than 300 males as an escort for the Chinese language consultant in Lhasa.[167] Moreover, China was to be exempt from the Commerce Laws commitments of April 20, 1908, however duty handed on to the Tibetans.[168] In response to Gray and the British authorities, London was entitled to cope with the problem by the Anglo-Russian Conference of 1907 itself for the reason that Saint Petersburg settlement didn’t concern the 1906 settlement made by China and Nice Britain in 1906 and Article 1 dedicated the 2 nations to implement the Anglo-Tibetan Settlement of 1904:
I’m to state that His Majesty’s Authorities base their motion upon their rights below article 2 of the Anglo-Russian Conference of 1907, which excepts from the operation of the conference the engagements entered into by Nice Britain and China in article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese language Conference of 1906, amongst which is that “to take always such steps as could also be essential to safe the due fulfilment of the phrases specified within the Anglo-Thibetan Settlement of 1904”. [169]
The British authorities would inform the Russian authorities on the progress of the negotiations, however Gray most popular to not enter into negotiations with Saint Petersburg instantly.[170] The secretary of state for International Affairs most popular to attend first for the progress of the negotiations with Tibet and China:
If the negotiations in India end result within the conclusion of a passable tripartite settlement, it can in all probability be essential to method the Russian Authorities once more with a view to securing enough freedom of motion to allow His Majesty’s Authorities to make sure that the settlement is carried out.[171]
[1] Монгол Улсын Үндэсний статистикийн хороо (https://www.nso.mn).
[2] On their historical past see O. LATTIMORE, Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Internal Asian Frontiers of China and Russia, Boston 1950, pp. 134-137.
[3] On the historical past of the area see Okay. N. MAKSIMOV, Kalmykia in Russia’s Previous and Current Nationwide Insurance policies and Administrative System, translated by A. Yastrzhembska, Budapest – New York 2008.
[4] International Workplace, Historic Part, Peace Handbook, Mongolia, No. 68, London 1920, p. 13.
[5] United Nations Division of Financial and Social Affairs/Inhabitants Division, World Inhabitants Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Vol. I: Complete Tables, New York 2011, p. 88.
[6] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 574, G. E. Morrison to D. D. Braham, February 18, 1913, p. 90.
[7] A. BAUSANI, Faith in Iran: From Zoroaster to Baha’u’llah, translated by J. M. Marchesi, New York 2000, p. 248.
[8] C. BELL, Tibet Previous and Current, Oxford 1924, p. 106.
[9] British Paperwork on the Origins of the Struggle: 1898–1914, edited by G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, Vol. IX: The Balkan Wars – Half I: The Prelude ; The Tripoli Struggle, London 1933, p. 804.
[10] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 98.
[11] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 99.
[12] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 99.
[13] See the entries «‘Hut‘ukht‘u» (No. 589) and «Cheptsundampa ‘Hut‘ukht‘u» (No. 596) in W. F. MAYERS, The Chinese language Authorities: a handbook of Chinese language titles, categorically organized and defined with an appendix, second version with additions by G. M. H. Playfair, Shanghai – Hongkong – Yokohama – London 1886; see additionally P. SCHWIEGER, The Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China: A Political Historical past of the Tibetan Establishment of Reincarnation, New York 2015, pp. 35-36.
[14] See: Okay. SAGASTER, The Historical past of Buddhism among the many Mongols, in: The Unfold of Buddhism, edited by A. Heirman and S. P. Bumbacher, Leiden – Boston 2007, p. 406; W. HEISSIG, The Religions of Mongolia, translated by G. Samuel, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1980, p. 31).
[15] On this see: A. BAREJA-STARZYŃSKA, The Mongolian Incarnation of Jo nang pa Tāranātha Kun dga’ snying po: Öndör Gegeen Zanabazar Blo bzang bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan (1635-1723): A case research of the Tibeto-Mongolian Relationship, in: The Tibet Journal, Vol. 34/35, No. 3/2, Particular Situation: The Earth Ox Papers, Autumn 2009-Summer time 2010, pp. 243-261; F. SANDERS, The Life and Lineage of the Ninth Khalkha Jetsun Dampa Khutukhtu of Urga, in: Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2001, pp. 278-286.
[16] On this and for a historical past of the nationwide symbols of unbiased Mongolia see J. BOLDBAATAR – C. HUMPHREY, The Strategy of Creation of Nationwide Symbols and Their Adoption within the 1992 Structure of Mongolia, in: Internal Asia, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007, pp. 3-22.
[17] C. KAPLONSKI, Reality, Historical past and Politics in Mongolia: Reminiscence of Heroes, London 2004, p. 29. For a biography of Zanabazar see S. ICHINNOROV, The biography of Öndör Gegeen, translated by Baasanjav, in: The Historical past of Mongolia, Vol. III, edited by D. Sneath and C. Kaplonski, Folkestone 2010, pp. 674-682.
[18] A. ANDREYEV, Soviet Russia and Tibet: the debacle of secret diplomacy, 1918-Thirties, Leiden 2003, p. 54. On the Mongol declaration of independence of 1911 see M. TACHIBANA, The 1911 Revolution and “Mongolia”: Independence, Constitutional Monarchy, or Republic, in: Journal of Up to date East Asia Research, 3:1, 2014, pp. 69-90.
[19] TACHIBANA 2014, p. 72.
[20] TACHIBANA 2014, p. 73.
[21] U. ONON – D. PRITCHATT, Asia’s First Trendy Revolution: Mongolia proclaims its Independence in 1911, Leiden 1989, p. 16. The interpretation of Ih Mongol Uls supplied by Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt of their e book is “nice Mongolian nation”.
[22] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, January 14, 1912, p. 165.
[23] T. NAKAMI, Mongolia from the Eighteenth Century to 1919, in: Historical past of Civilizations of Central Asia, pp. 348-349.
[24] L. PETECH, Asia Centrale, in: Le civiltà dell’Oriente. Storia, letteratura, religioni, filosofia, scienze e arte, Vol. I: Storia, below the course of G. Tucci, Firenze – Roma 1965, p. 948.
[25] PETECH, Asia Centrale 1965, p. 948; P. C. PERDUE, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, Cambridge – London 2005, pp. 175-176.
[26] PETECH, Asia Centrale 1965, p. 956.
[27] PETECH, Asia Centrale 1965, pp. 956-957; S. Okay. SONI, Mongolia-China Relations: Trendy and Up to date Occasions, New Delhi 2006, p. 30; M. LAN, China’s “New Administration” in Mongolia, in: Mongolia within the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan, edited by S. Kotkin and B. A. Elleman, Armonk – London 1999, p. 40.
[28] T. E. EWING, Between the Hammer and the Anvil? Chinese language and Russian Insurance policies in Outer Mongolia 1911-1921, Uralic and Altaic Collection, Vols 138-139, London – New York 2006, pp. 23-24.
[29] S. Okay. SONI, Mongolia-Russia Relations (Kiakhta to Vladivostok), New Delhi 2002, pp. 27-28.
[30] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian State of affairs, March 20, 1913, p. 165. The Russian identify of the town, Kyakhta, was adopted on this work. Hiagt is the Mongolian identify, the Buryat one is Kyaagta and in Chinese language is called Ch’ia-k’o-t’u 恰克圖. In English it’s typically transcribed as Kyakhta or Kiakhta. Kyakhta is in the present day in Russia, within the Republic of Buryatia. On this work the Russian identify of the town was adopted: Kyakhta.
[31] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian State of affairs, March 20, 1913, p. 165.
[32] ONON – PRITCHATT 1989, p. 5.
[33] LAN 1999, p. 47.
[34] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, pp. 48-49.
[35] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 574, G. E. Morrison to D. D. Braham, February 18, 1913, pp. 90-91.
[36] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 550, G. E. Morrison to C. W. Campbell, October 24, 1912, p. 41.
[37] PETECH, Asia Centrale 1965, p. 956.
[38] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian State of affairs, March 20, 1913, p. 165.
[39] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian State of affairs, March 20, 1913, p. 165.
[40] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, January 14, 1912, p. 165.
[41] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, January 14, 1912, p. 165.
[42] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian State of affairs, March 20, 1913, p. 165.
[43] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 184, Notes by Lieutenant Binsteed on the Mongolian State of affairs, March 20, 1913, p. 167.
[44] TNA, FO 535/13, No. 48 A, Authorities of India to Viscount Morley. – (Communicated by India Workplace, March 21.), March 19, 1910, p. 44*; TNA, FO 535/13, No. 48 C, Authorities of India to Viscount Morley. – (Communicated by India Workplace, March 22.), March 22, 1910, p. 44*.
[45] TNA, YA HAN-CHANG 牙含章 1984, p. 231. Ya’s supply for the transcript of the plan of Wen Tsung-yao 溫宗堯 is: CHU CHIN-P’ING 朱錦屏, Hsi tsang liu shih nien ta shih chi 西藏六十年大事記.
[46] EWING 2006, p. 18.
[47] I. V. NAUMOV, The Historical past of Siberia, edited by D. N. Collins, London – New York 2006, p. 123.
[48] C. R. BAWDEN, The Trendy Historical past of Mongolia, London – New York 2009, p. 50; EWING 2006, pp. 16-17.
[49] EWING 2006, p. 17.
[50] M. KHODARKOVSKY, Non-Russian topics, in: The Cambridge Historical past of Russia, Vol. I: From Early Rus’ to 1689, edited by M. Perrie, Cambridge 2006, p. 528. The entire textual content of the treaty (in French) is in J. B. DU HALDE, Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l’empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise, enrichie des Cartes générales et particulieres de ces Pays, de la Carte générale et des Cartes particulieres du Thibet, & de la Corée ; & ornée d’un grand nombre de Figures & de Vignettes gravées en tailledouce, Tome Quatrième, La Haye 1736, pp. 242-245.
[51] EWING 2006, p. 18.
[52] EWING 2006, p. 18.
[53] EWING 2006, p. 18.
[54] EWING 2006, p. 18-19.
[55] EWING 2006, p. 18.
[56] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 48, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 11, 1912, p. 52. English translation of the communiqué: TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 66, Official Communiqué from the Ministry of International Affairs, printed within the “Official Messenger” dated December 29, 1911 (January 11), 1912, pp. 99-100.
[57] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 56, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 14, 1912, p. 57.
[58] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 48, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 11, 1912, p. 52; TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 66, Official Communiqué from the Ministry of International Affairs, printed within the “Official Messenger” dated December 29, 1911 (January 11), 1912, p. 100.
[59] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 56, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 14, 1912, p. 57.
[60] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 56, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 14, 1912, p. 57.
[61] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, January 14, 1912, p. 165.
[62] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 137, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, January 14, 1912, p. 166.
[63] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 215, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, January 29, 1912, p. 235. The supply of the British ambassador is Mr. Sly, the British consul in Harbin. Man-chou-li is understood in English as Manchuria Station and in Mongolian as Manjuur.
[64] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, February 20, 1912, p. 330.
[65] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, February 20, 1912, p. 330.
[66] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, February 20, 1912, p. 331.
[67] Present capital of the Hei-lung-chiang province (Chinese language: Ha-êrh-pin哈爾濱).
[68] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, February 20, 1912, p. 331.
[69] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 434, Performing Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, February 28, 1912, p. 388. Consul Sly’s supply was the American consul who had heard from a health care provider, Dr. Jee, about Man-chou-li’s (TNA, FO 405/208, No. 215, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, January 29, 1912, p. 235).
[70] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 356, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, February 20, 1912, p. 331.
[71] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 434, Performing Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, February 28, 1912, p. 388.
[72] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 434, Performing Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, February 28, 1912, p. 388.
[73] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 460, Performing Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, March 5, 1912, pp. 438-439.
[74] TNA, FO 405/208, Enclosure in No. 539, Performing Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan, March 31, 1912, p. 529.
[75] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 539, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, April 5, 1912, pp. 528-529.
[76] The textual content of the key Conference of June 21, 1910 (July 4, 1910, in line with the Gregorian calendar) in French (authentic textual content) and English translation is in PRICE 1933, pp. 113-116.
[77] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 165, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, March 14, 1913, p. 133; full textual content of the memorandum: TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, pp. 135-137.
[78] The province of Chih-li not exists and Ch’ih-feng is positioned within the Internal Mongolia Autonomous Area.
[79] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, pp. 135-136.
[80] The supply on this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 136.
[81] The supply on this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 136.
[82] The supply on this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 136.
[83] The supply on this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 136.
[84] Jehol (Je-ho 熱河), in the present day often known as Ch’eng-te 承德, within the present province of Ho-pei.
[85] The supply on this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 136.
[86] In Chinese language: Chang-chia-k’ou 张家口. It’s in historic Internal Mongolia, in the present day within the province of Ho-pei. In English it’s usually transcribed as Kalgan.
[87] Ta-t’ung is in Shan-hsi.
[88] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 136.
[89] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 136.
[90] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 136.
[91] The supply on this case is Frans August Larson, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, pp. 136-137.
[92] The supply on this case is Lieutenant Binsteed, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 137.
[93] The supply on this case is George Ernest Morrison, TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 165, Memorandum on Navy State of affairs in Mongolia, p. 137.
[94] Full textual content (German translation of the Russian textual content and French translation of the Chinese language model): H. TRIEPEL, Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités et autres actes relatifs aux rapports de droit worldwide, Troisiéme Série, Tome VII, Leipzig 1913, pp. 11-17.
[95] TNA, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 13, 1913, FO 535/16, No. 23, p. 13.
[96] TNA, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 13, 1913, FO 535/16, No. 23, p. 13; BAWDEN 2009, p. 194.
[97] TNA, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 13, 1913, FO 535/16, No. 23, p. 13.
[98] TACHIBANA 2014, p. 73.
[99] BAWDEN 2009, p. 194.
[100] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 50, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 26, 1913, p. 44. On this regard, the tsar himself had already expressed his settlement, TNA, FO 535/16, No. 50, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 26, 1913, p. 44.
[101] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 61, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 31, 1913, p. 50.
[102] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 61, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 31, 1913, p. 50.
[103] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 82, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 5, 1913, p. 61.
[104] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 82, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 5, 1913, p. 61; TNA, FO 535/16, No. 136, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, March 13, 1913, p. 98.
[105] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 82, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 5, 1913, p. 61.
[106] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 82, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 5, 1913, p. 61.
[107] TNA, FO 405/211, Enclosure in No. 28, Mongolian International Board to the British International Workplace, p. 25.
[108] TNA, FO 405/211, Enclosure in No. 28, Mongolian International Board to the British International Workplace, p. 25.
[109] TNA, FO 405/211, No. 52, Sir Edward Gray to Sir G. Buchanan, January 16, 1913, p. 60.
[110] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 574, G. E. Morrison to D. D. Braham, February 18, 1913, p. 91.
[111] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 41, Board of Commerce to International Workplace, January 22, 1913, p. 28.
[112] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 41, Board of Commerce to International Workplace, January 22, 1913, p. 28.
[113] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 29, 1913, p. 141.
[114] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 136, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, March 13, 1913, p. 98.
[115] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 30, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, January 17, 1913, p. 20.
[116] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 88, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 11, 1913, p. 66; TNA, FO 535/16, No. 88, Mongol-Thibetan Treaty, concluded at Urga December 29, 1912 (January 11, 1913), 1913, pp. 66-67; TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 88, Despatch from Precise State Councillor Korostovets, dated Urga, January 6 (19), 1913, pp. 67-68.
[117] English translation of the treaty: TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 1 in No. 88, Mongol-Thibetan Treaty, concluded at Urga December 29, 1912 (January 11, 1913), 1913, pp. 66-67.
[118] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 88, Despatch from Precise State Councillor Korostovets, dated Urga, January 6 (19), 1913, p. 67. Within the English translation of the dispatch within the Confidential Print there may be an error within the relationship, in line with the Gregorian calendar, of the Russo-Mongol treaty: the treaty dates again to October 21, 1912, that’s November 3, 1912, and never September 3, as indicated within the Confidential Print’s doc.
[119] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 44, International Workplace to India Workplace, January 24, 1913, p. 30.
[120] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 80, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 8, 1913, p. 60.
[121] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 88, Despatch from Precise State Councillor Korostovets, dated Urga, January 6 (19), 1913, pp. 67-68.
[122] ZHWA SGAB PA DBANG PHYUG BDE LDAN, Vol. II 1976, pp. 135-136.
[123] TNA, FO 535/12, Inclosure 1 in No. 7, Memorandum respecting an Interview between the Dalai Lama and the Maharaj Kumar of Sikkim, held on the Yellow Temple, Peking, on November 25, 1908, p. 9.
[124] Full textual content of the report: TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 164, Notes by Mr. Rose on Mongolian Affairs, pp. 131-133.
[125] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 164, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, March 10, 1913, pp. 130-131.
[126] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 130, Sir Edward Gray to Sir G. Buchanan, March 11, 1913, p. 94.
[127] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 88, Despatch from Precise State Councillor Korostovets, dated Urga, January 6 (19), 1913, p. 67.
[128] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 112, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, February 10, 1913, p. 80.
[129] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 129, Authorities of India to the Marquess of Crewe, March 9, 1913, p. 94.
[130] His mom was a Lepcha, whereas his father was a Scottish planter. See MCKAY 1997, p. 44.
[131] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 255, British Commerce Agent, Yatung, to the Political Officer, Sikkim, Might 3, 1913, p. 255.
[132] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 2 in No. 255, British Commerce Agent, Yatung, to the Political Officer, Sikkim, Might 3, 1913, p. 255.
[133] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 1 in No. 255, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Authorities of India, Might 9, 1913, p. 255.
[134] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 98.
[135] MCKAY 1997, p. 56.
[136] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 574, G. E. Morrison to D. D. Braham, February 18, 1913, p. 90.
[137] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 99.
[138] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure 1 in No. 255, Political Officer, Sikkim, to the Authorities of India, Might 9, 1913, p. 255.
[139] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 99.
[140] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 98.
[141] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 98.
[142] SYKES 1940, pp. 226-229 and pp. 235-236.
[143] SYKES 1940, pp. 236.
[144] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 137, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 17, 1913, p. 99.
[145] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 92, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 13, 1913, p. 69.
[146] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 92, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 13, 1913, p. 69.
[147] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 92, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 13, 1913, p. 69.
[148] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 89, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 14, 1913, p. 68.
[149] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 89, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Gray, February 14, 1913, p. 68.
[150] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 541, G. E. Morrison to H. A. Gwynne, September 1912, pp. 27-28.
[151] TNA, FO 405/208, No. 165, Sir Edward Gray to Sir E. Goschen, February 7, 1912, p. 190.
[152] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 151, India Workplace to International Workplace, March 25, 1913, p. 110.
[153] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 151, India Workplace to International Workplace, March 25, 1913, pp. 110-111.
[154] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 152, India Workplace to International Workplace, March 25, 1913, p. 111.
[155] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, p. 51. Full textual content of the letter: The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, pp. 47-53.
[156] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, p. 52.
[157] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, p. 51.
[158] The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2013, n. 554, T. A. Rustad to G. E. Morrison, November 5, 1912, p. 51.
[159] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 29, 1913, p. 140. The complete textual content of the doc is within the Annexes.
[160] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 29, 1913, p. 141.
[161] TNA, FO 535/15, No. 285, Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Gray, November 16, 1912, p. 223.
[162] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 29, 1913, p. 141.
[163] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 168, International Workplace to India Workplace, March 29, 1913, p. 141.
[164] TNA, FO 535, No. 176, India Workplace to International Workplace, April 2, 1913, p. 154.
[165] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 231, Sir Edward Gray to Sir G. Buchanan, Might 23, 1913, p. 237.
[166] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 231, Revised Draft of Treaty with China respecting Thibet, p. 238.
[167] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 231, Revised Draft of Treaty with China respecting Thibet, p. 238.
[168] TNA, FO 535/16, Enclosure in No. 231, Revised Draft of Treaty with China respecting Thibet, p. 238.
[169] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 231, Sir Edward Gray to Sir G. Buchanan, Might 23, 1913, p. 237.
[170] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 231, Sir Edward Gray to Sir G. Buchanan, Might 23, 1913, pp. 237-238.
[171] TNA, FO 535/16, No. 231, Sir Edward Gray to Sir G. Buchanan, Might 23, 1913, p. 238.
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