There is something about Narendra Modi. You may like him or dislike him, vote for him or oppose him viscerally. But it is clear that the Prime Minister knows how to seize an opportunity, use his political strength to hold on to certain positions, show flexibility when needed, and then own the decision politically. And nowhere has this been more apparent than in the domain of foreign policy in a particularly difficult environment. Think terror on Pakistan, the balance on Russia, the calibrated line on China, and, now, the embrace of the US.
There is also something about Joe Biden. You may think he is too old for the job, or may admire his courage through adversity and his experience. But it is clear that, domestically, he has navigated the US through a tough period (remember the January 6 Capitol storming and the pandemic), pushed through transformative legislations (pandemic relief, climate and domestic manufacturing, semiconductors, infrastructure), stick to a decision (think support for Ukraine), and run an intellectually coherent and broadly effective foreign policy in the first two years of his term, which includes methodical competition with China and, now, the embrace of India.
The 80-year-old born in Pennsylvania’s Scranton and the 72-year-old born in Gujarat’s Vadnagar could not be more different. One has been a lifelong Democrat, held on to broadly liberal internationalist positions, and found his natural home in the American legislature before making the journey down the hill on Washington’s Pennsylvania Avenue to the executive branch in the White House, as first vice-president and then president. The other is harder to categorise (the conventional social and economic Left-Right matrix), has been an ardent nationalist, and, as a man of action, found his natural home in the political party organisational structure and then the executive branch, and has treated the legislature as necessary but also an impediment.
When the two men met, it was their commonalities rather than their differences that prevailed. There was a conviction of what it is their respective national interest; Biden believes India is essential if China has to be prevented from dominating future geopolitics and geo-economics and the relationship has depth due to the people-to-people connect; Modi knows American and Indian societies have a natural warmth and US support is critical to enhance Indian capabilities. And they also ended up liking each other and developing a connection.
Both took a decision, developed a personal relationship, determined areas of priorities, told their systems to make it work, and agreed that if democracies had to deliver, they had to show outcomes.
Modi had external affairs minister S Jaishankar, national security adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval, foreign secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra, Indian ambassador to the US Taranjit Singh Sandhu, additional secretary in charge of Americas Vani Rao, India’s deputy chief of mission in Washington Sripriya Ranganathan and their capable teams. Biden had his NSA Jake Sullivan, National Security Council (NSC) Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell, NSC senior director Eileen Laubacher, NSC senior director for tech Tarun Chhabra, secretary of state Antony J Blinken, secretary of defense Lloyd Austin, commerce secretary Gina Raimondo, and assistant secretaries in Pentagon and State, Ely Ratner and Donald Lu with their respective teams.
What happened in Washington over the past week was this confluence of the personal connect between leaders, the decisiveness they showed, and the systemic convergence that was enabled by the hard work of ministers and bureaucrats on both sides.
The outcome is hard to describe. Is it a turning point? Well, the India-US story has been of increasing convergence — and so this is not necessarily a shift. Is it just progress? Well, the India-US story has also been marked by incremental movement (barring the nuclear deal) — and so it may not capture the scale of what happened? But perhaps the phrase that captures it is what was used in a column on these pages sometime before the visit — a Great Leap Forward.
Both leaders, and their systems, decided to take a leap of trust. The Americans realised that to overcome the scepticism that has remained deep within Indian defence and intelligence set-ups about US reliability, despite increasing cooperation in the past two decades, they needed to show concrete deliverables. They realised that specific interests, in the context of China’s challenge in every domain from geo-economics to geostrategy to new technologies, required India’s slow, unannounced, but institutionalised integration into the domains of the future with the West. The Indians realised that this was a new dynamic; they could hold on to their positions in geographies where they differed with the US in methods, but suddenly the convergence in goals had expanded. And this could be translated into real dividends in multiple domains where India needed the American State’s approval for technology, its private sector’s vast capital, and its unparalleled intellectual infrastructure’s collaboration.
And this is why the Americans laid out the red carpet with public flattery, pomp and ceremony. And the Indians reciprocated by truly acknowledging the symbolism and collaborating on the substance. For once, it wasn’t hyperbole when American political national security leaders and managers and even the more cautious Indian political leadership and bureaucratic executors said they were thrilled with what had just happened.
One way to look at what happened is through specific deals — the US allowing GE jet engine tech transfer is a big deal, India buying Predator drones is a big deal, India signing the Artemis Accords is a big deal, the US embracing India in the Mineral Security Partnership is a big deal, Micron and other semiconductor companies investing in India is a big deal, more Indian investments in American manufacturing and energy (who would have that thought two decades ago?) is a big deal, India and the US developing an alternative telecom infrastructure is a big deal, them deciding to work together in shaping research in new scientific and tech domains and how to regulate it is a big deal.
But even beyond that, the real significance of what happened lies in the idea of trust and the bet on the long-term. Both systems decided that they wanted closer integration in their most sensitive domains. And both decided that they could trust each other enough to proceed with that. And that is where the two politicians came into the picture.
Biden, who got elected to the US Senate in the early 1970s in his late 20s, and Modi, who joined a political-cultural movement in the 1960s in his teens, trusted their experience and instincts. What they delivered was a transformative moment with consequences for their countries, for the relationship, and for the world.
