India-Maldives relations were expected to face renewed strains when Mohamed Muizzu, the leader of the Opposition People’s National Congress, won the November 2023 presidential election on an “India-Out” populist plank. After taking office, he has asked India to withdraw its contingent of 75 defence personnel who operate the Dornier aircraft and helicopters gifted by the country for surveillance of Maldives’ large exclusive economic zone (EEZ), disaster relief operations across more than a thousand islands in the Maldives spread over a vast ocean space, and to promote maritime security under the Colombo Security Conclave of which the Maldives is a founder member. The new government has also declined to renew an agreement under which India was assisting in carrying out a hydrographic survey of the country’s EEZ. There has so far not been any official reaction from the Indian side. Muizzu maintains that India has acceded to his requests.
Muizzu embarked on an official four-day visit to China on January 8 this year. On the eve of the visit, an ugly controversy erupted when three deputy ministers in Muizzu’s government posted highly derogatory remarks about Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi and Indians in general on social media. These were apparently in reaction to photos of PM Modi’s recent visit to the Lakshadweep islands on social media, some contending that these islands could emerge as an even more attractive tourist destination than the Maldives, which lies just south of Lakshadweep. A social media war erupted thereafter with Indian celebrities calling for a boycott of the Maldives. There were cancellations of hotel and flight bookings by Indian tourists planning to visit the Maldives. This has hit the country’s tourist industry since India has constituted, since the past few years, the largest share of the islands’ tourist traffic. It should not be forgotten that before the Covid-19 pandemic, it was China which was number one in tourist arrivals and will likely regain that spot with the removal of all travel restrictions by China.
During Muizzu’s visit to China, a joint press statement was issued that declared a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” between the two countries. The statement also marks the Maldives’ willing participation in three key Chinese initiatives — the Global Civilisational Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). Maldives has joined the “Group of Friends of the GDI”. It has welcomed projects under the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. There is the standard Chinese support for Maldives’ territorial integrity and sovereignty and opposition to any external interference in its domestic affairs. India is the unnamed target.
There are two important omissions in the joint statement. There is no reference to the implementation of the controversial Free Trade Agreement concluded between the two countries during the visit of former President Abdulla Yameen to Beijing in 2017, according a most favourable position to China. It has been lying in the deep freeze since then. The Chinese ambassador in Male has been pushing for its revival.
Secondly, a Chinese project for a joint observation station which would have given it a vantage position to monitor maritime traffic in this part of the Indian Ocean has also not been mentioned. These are the few relatively positive straws in the wind but they could be revived later. India will need to maintain a careful watch on these developments.
The absence of the Maldives from the Colombo Security Conclave held in Mauritius on December 7, 2023, is a setback. India initiated a trilateral maritime security platform with Sri Lanka and the Maldives in 2011. This played an important role in fostering cooperation among these countries, led by their respective National Security Advisors, on an agenda comprising maritime security, counter-terrorism, human trafficking and cyber security. In 2020, with the entry of Mauritius into the grouping, the forum was re-christened as the Colombo Security Conclave with its secretariat in Colombo. At the recent Mauritius meeting, the Seychelles and Bangladesh joined as observers but may become full members later. The absence of the Maldives, obviously to win kudos from the Chinese, is a blow.
What should be India’s approach in the light of these negative developments?
One, foreign policy must not be run in response to social media. We should not neglect the fact that the three ministers responsible for the offensive tweets have been suspended and the Maldivian government has condemned its ministers’ actions categorically though it has not rendered an official apology.
Two, the parliament in the Maldives is dominated by the India-friendly Maldives Democratic Party, whose representatives have severely condemned the anti-Modi tweets, demanded that an official apology be made and spoken highly of the longstanding support and goodwill India has rendered to the Maldives. In the recent mayoral elections in Male, the Opposition has won convincingly, even though Muizzu was the mayor of the capital before becoming president. It is likely that the forthcoming elections to the parliament may be won by political forces friendly to India. Indian actions must not do anything to undermine this strong and significant constituency, which has positive sentiments towards India. The recent statement by India’s external affairs minister, pointing to the importance of upholding the strong people-to-people relations between the two countries is an important corrective to the deluge of anti-Maldivian social media comments.
India’s neighbourhood policy cannot be episodic. It needs to be consistent and with strong engagement being pursued even when domestic politics in neighbouring countries are not favourable. The Maldives is strategically important enough for India to weigh its words and actions on developments there carefully.
Patience will pay.
Shyam Saran is a former foreign secretary and an honorary fellow, CPR. The views expressed are personal
