The 20th Communist Party of China (CPC) will be convening its five-year party Congress on October 16. This will be watched keenly for several reasons.
One, while it is almost certain that the current party and State leader, Xi Jinping, will continue in these positions for at least another five years, it is not certain whether there will be a move to make him a leader for life as Mao Zedong (1949-1976) was.
Two, there are rumours that the party constitution may be changed to alter Xi’s position to that of party chairman, and not just the party’s general secretary. This would accord him the same status as Mao Zedong, who served as party chairman throughout his tenure. After Mao died in 1976, his chosen successor, Hua Kuofeng, did serve as party chairman, but this position was done away with in 1982, under Deng Xiaoping. Thereafter, the party leadership rested with the general secretary.
Three, there are reports that there will be a change to reduce the current description of Xi Jinping’s doctrinal ideas from “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era” to a handy “Xi Jinping Thought”. Mao Zedong’s ideas are referred to as Mao Zedong Thought in the party constitution, and a change in how Xi’s ideas are described will put him in the same league, optically. In CPC media in the run-up to the 20th party Congress, Xi is also referred to as a “helmsman”, which was also an appellation used for Mao.
Whether these reports prove accurate or not, it is clear that Xi will continue as China’s top leader and enjoy an enhanced status similar to Mao Zedong. The latter is unquestionably regarded as the most revered and powerful Chinese leader in the CPC pantheon.
The five-year party Congresses witness a significant change in party personnel at different levels. The CPC has 95 million members, and there will be 2,280 delegates to the Congress from all over the country. These delegates will then choose 204 central committee (CC) members and 172 alternate members. At the next level are 25 Politburo (PB) members and, currently, seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), which is the apex-level body.
Since Deng Xiaoping introduced certain reforms, party functionaries have observed a mandatory retirement age. They also cannot serve more than two five-year terms in leadership positions. According to an analysis done by Washington-based think-tank Brookings, it is likely that in observance of these norms, two-thirds of the central committee will change, as will half of the PB and perhaps half of PBSC.
There is some unpredictability in this respect since there was a party announcement that personnel changes may not be based “solely on age”. Exceptions are likely to apply to the higher echelons of leadership. Nevertheless, there will be a new generation of better educated and more technocratic party members in leadership positions. This seems to be the case, particularly among the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) representatives.
The party Congress is convening in a challenging domestic and external environment for China and Xi. The Chinese economy is facing unprecedented headwinds. There are supply chain disruptions as Xi’s zero-Covid-19 policy has led to frequent lockdowns in several major urban centres in the country. The services sector and consumption have been severely impacted. The property sector, which constitutes nearly 30% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is in a persistent crisis and facing a meltdown. There is a resurgence of socialist orthodoxy, which has shaken the vibrant and eminently successful private sector. There is renewed stress on the public sector as the leading force in the economic and technological transformation of the country. The reform and opening up strategy associated with Deng Xiaoping is being modified even though the rhetoric remains the same. China’s GDP is expected to grow by about 3% or less this year, against a target of 5.5%.
The external environment, too, has shifted in an adverse direction. The relationship with the United States (US) has worsened, and European perceptions of China have moved from tacit neutrality to adversarial. China is now described as a “systemic rival.” In the Indo-Pacific, China faces a more crystallised, more coherent Quad (India, US, Japan and Australia), a US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and an Australia, United Kingdom and US alliance (AUKUS), which has an explicit nuclear dimension. China bet on its “no-limits partnership” with Russia, but with the Ukraine conflict pulling Russia deeper into the quicksand of an unwinnable war, Chinese anxieties are mounting. There have been questions about Xi’s judgment in hitching China closely to Putin’s now-tattered mast.
Xi has been trying to assert his leadership by conveying both confidence in achieving the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation and also drawing attention to the greater struggles that lie ahead. Both, he seems to suggest, require the unquestioned leadership of the party with himself as the “core” and now the helmsman.
India should monitor the party Congress carefully because it will contain important clues to the domestic and external policy direction we may expect in the next several years. However, judging by the rhetoric leading up to the Congress, one does not expect a shift that may augur a more benign phase in India-China relations.
Shyam Saran is a former foreign secretary and a senior fellow, Centre for Policy ResearchThe views expressed are personal
