Within the huge and storied political panorama of Africa, the West African sub-region has sure distinctive options that set it other than the remainder of the continent. Boafo-Arthur (2008) known as it the “heartbeat of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa”, claiming that it served because the vanguard of armed resistance towards colonial rule. Liberia, which gained independence in 1847, is the oldest African republic. Ghana was the primary nation in Sub-Saharan Africa to realize independence in 1957. Guinea’s independence from France in 1958 proved to be the primary in a line of dominoes that finally led to the independence of the remaining Francophone international locations within the continent.
Sadly, West Africa additionally has the doubtful distinction of ushering in a phenomena that may plague the continent for the subsequent sixty years; regime adjustments by technique of army coup d’états. The literature consensually agrees that the Togolese coup of 1963, which noticed the assassination of prime minister Sylvanus Olympio, set the blueprint for all of Africa’s forays into army adventurism (Owusu, 1971; Conteh-Morgan, 2000; Boafo-Arthur, 2008; Kemmence, 2013). McGowan and Johnson (1984) would describe West Africa as ‘the area par excellence of the army coup d’état’ for having the best document of coup exercise in comparison with wherever else on the earth. McGowan and Johnson (1984) and Kemmence (2013) famous that, regardless of encompassing one-third of all majority-ruled African States, this sub-region has seen about half of all profitable coups d’états, one-third of all reported coups and half of all reported plots within the continent. The one nation out of the 16 international locations within the sub-region that has by no means witnessed a army coup to this date is Cape Verde.
What makes West Africa weak to coups? This paper, upon synthesis of the surveyed literature, recognized three broad causes, particularly ethnic fractionalization, lack of financial progress and army dominance over civilians. All of those elements work in synergy with one another, creating an atmosphere conducive for coup actions.
The connection between social cleavages between ethnic teams and the persistence of coups was additional operationalized by Jackson (1978) into three components; social mobilization, cultural pluralism and political elements such because the prevailing political celebration system and mass participation. In keeping with him, whereas a single-party system has a stabilizing impact on governments in international locations that not too long ago attained independence, a variety of political events can create a turbulent socio-political ecosystem. When confronted with electoral turnout, this destabilizing impact attributable to a multi-party political equipment is additional amplified by the dominance of a single ethnic group. Most West African international locations affiliate political events with ethnic groupings (Kemmence, 2013). This partisanship seeps into the army, creating circumstances for rivalries that finally end in coups and counter-coups. A outstanding instance of a multi-party system and ethnic fractionalization catalyzing instability was in Benin after it declared independence from France. The interval between 1960 and 1972 noticed a cavalcade of regime adjustments by coups, with figures like Hubert Maga, Sourou-Migan Apithy and Justin Ahomadegbe-Tometin rising to energy; all three of those males represented a unique political celebration, and every political celebration predominantly represented a unique ethnic group coming from completely different areas in Benin. However, freshly impartial Niger was dominated for essentially the most half by a single-party regime, which managed to stabilize the rebellion of the much less dominant Touareg group towards the dominant Hausa group. Regardless that the previous instance noticed better success of coup-realization, it’s simple that ethnic fractionalization has created circumstances for the plotting and try (if not success) of coups in each these international locations.
Coming to financial efficiency, Johnson and McGowan (1984) supplied empirical proof which advised that financial underperformance was a major issue that might doubtlessly result in coups. Additionally they argued that some measures of optimistic financial efficiency, resembling excessive ranges of productive employment, strong financial progress, sound export efficiency and diversified commodity exports, are extremely stabilizing. Nevertheless, Adebayo (2002) challenged this evaluation by pointing to Nigeria and Togo repeatedly present process regime adjustments and (failed) coup makes an attempt, regardless of their outstanding financial progress. Clearly, there’s some lack of consensus within the literature relating to the influence of financial underperformance on the probability of coup makes an attempt, although this paper argues that Johnson and McGowan (1984) made a extra compelling case by learning underlying antecedents to coup actions in all international locations of Africa.
Lastly, army dominance over civilians additionally performs a job in subverting the socio-political order. Janowitz (1977) and Kemmence (2013) each addressed the nigh non-existent civil-military relations in West Africa; Kemmence argued that the repetitive army coups in Guinea-Bissau had been a direct results of the shortage of civil-military relations. He argued:
…although the nation has a civil authorities, the army dictates and controls each transfer of the civil rulers who’re truly the puppets of the generals within the army
A studying of West Africa’s post-colonial political historical past means that the army and civilians consistently feud with one another, with each teams having their very own inside cleavages and energy struggles, finally leading to tumultuous civil discord. Finally, the army nearly all the time emerges because the dominant actor in instances of battle. This leads us to query, why would the army wish to intervene within the political functioning of those international locations? McBride (2004) chalks it down to private greed, motivated by the wealth and privileges loved as soon as they achieve energy and management over the state. How is it that the army is ready to simply overpower civilians on this sub-region? Adebajo and Rashid (2002) contend that it’s due to the huge sources on the disposal of the army, establishing a correlation between army spending and occurence of coups. Nigeria, for example, has essentially the most resourceful army in all of Africa they usually’ve reported essentially the most coup plots (together with failed makes an attempt and successes) at fifteen as of 2018.
Are the relentless coups undermining democratization in West Africa?
In keeping with the Polity IV scores of West African nations between 1958 to 2018, 7 out of 15 international locations (excluding Cape Verde) have, in some unspecified time in the future, obtained a rating that may place them in every of the Polity IV classes; autocracy (-10 to -6), closed anocracy (-5 to -1), open anocracy (0 to five) and democracy (6 to 10). These international locations are Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Nigeria. Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea and Mauritania have obtained scores in some unspecified time in the future on this interval that positioned their regime sort as both autocratic, closed anocratic or open anocratic. Nevertheless, they by no means scored excessive sufficient to be thought-about democratic. Togo is the one nation to not have progressed past the ‘closed anocracy’ regime sort. Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone have undergone all regime varieties aside from closed anocracy, whereas Senegal has undergone all regime varieties aside from open anocracy. Scatter-plots illustrating intervals of every regime sort for every nation is introduced in Appendix 1, graphs 1 to 4. An inspection of the scatter-plots demonstrates that, for many international locations, their standing as a ‘democracy’, ‘anocracy’ or ‘autocracy’ is just not outlined by a steady time-period, however is reasonably dispersed all through their historical past. Ghana, for example, began as an autocracy post-independence and, following a 1978 coup, was categorised as a democracy. Nevertheless, following the 1981 coup, Ghana as soon as once more regressed into an autocratic regime. Over time, the regime grew to become progressively much less autocratic, till it achieved full democracy as soon as it attained some stability (Appendix 2). Comparable tendencies could be noticed in Gambia, Liberia, Mali and several other different international locations within the sub-region. This pattern is indicative of the destabilizing energy of coup d’états and the way they undermine the democratization of this sub-region. Boafo-Arthur (2004) and Conteh-Morgan (2000) argued that the political instability shepherded by the tradition of militarism has jeopardized the institution of a gradual democracy within the sub-region. The onset of the third wave of democracy within the early Nineteen Nineties did arouse some optimism that the sub-region is on the verge of reaching political equilibrium. Nevertheless, the expectations of a secure democracy are but to materialize (Boafo-Arthur, 2004). Côte d’Ivoire is one instance of a rustic that was an aspiration within the sub-region for sustaining stability and progressing in direction of a full democracy. Sadly, the nation imploded following a number of coup makes an attempt from 1999 to 2002. Sierra Leone and Liberia are nonetheless making an attempt to forge a secure political mannequin after landmark elections in 2002 and 2005, respectively. The elections within the two international locations additionally marked the top years of civil wars. In 1997, Liberia had an election (albeit, underneath questionable circumstances in accordance with Boafo-Arthur (2004)) to finish the civil conflict that began in late 1989. Charles Taylor gained that election however the instability in Liberia (principally inspired by Taylor himself), continued till he was pressured into exile in Nigeria in 2003. In a nutshell, the West African sub-region has struggled to attain sustained democracy within the face of speedy regime adjustments.
Figuring out some analysis gaps: Are democratic regimes actually much less inclined to coups in West Africa?
As talked about within the earlier sub-section of the literature evaluation, an awesome majority of the nations in West Africa have skilled the complete spectrum of regime varieties, starting from autocracy to democracy, of their quick post-colonial historical past. Moreover, all 15 international locations underneath examination, besides Senegal, confronted a minimum of one reported coup try in every of the regime varieties that they skilled. That is illustrated within the scatter-plot given in Appendix 3. Senegal skilled just one coup try on this interval, when Mamadou Dia did not overthrow sitting president Leopold Sedar Senghor in 1962. Senegal had a polity rating of -4 in 1962 (making it a closed anocracy that 12 months) and has not confronted a coup try since.
On condition that loads of these nations have skilled a minimum of one coup in every regime sort, this sub-region could be ultimate for learning whether or not democratic regimes are actually extra inclined or resilient to coups than autocratic and anocratic regimes. Nevertheless, only a few research have empirically explored this sub-region particularly (outdoors of research wanting into Sub-Saharan Africa as a complete) and investigated country-wise results.
The connection between regime varieties and their susceptibility to coup makes an attempt is a contentious one among students; Tulaslem (2015) referred to it as an “empirical conundrum that is still unsolved”. Huntington (1968), Linz (1978), and O’Donnell (1979) all argue towards the standard knowledge that democracies are resilient to regime instability, primarily as a result of they invite political pluralism. The domineering presence of curiosity teams tends to weaken the state from finishing up its capability to control successfully. When financial modernization outpaces the event of democratic political establishments, the emergence of political order and stability turns into much less doubtless. In consequence, coups, revolutions, and the breakdown of democratic establishments are doubtless eventualities in extremely democratic regimes. Powell et al (2017) discovered that younger democracies are extra predisposed to coup makes an attempt than both civilian authoritarian regimes or older democracies. Whereas none of this literature focuses on West Africa particularly, the findings is perhaps related to establishing a priori expectations of this paper’s closing outcomes.
However, trendy empirical research by Casper and Tyson (2014), Marinov (2014), Tusalem (2015) and Bell (2016) have supplied ample proof utilizing a worldwide pattern that democracies (with a better Polity IV rating) are much less coup-prone than autocracies; Bell (2016) has additionally validated this speculation for Sub-Saharan African nations individually. In actual fact, essentially the most convincing argument for anticipating West African democracies to be much less coup-prone than autocracies could be discovered within the aforementioned Powell et al. (2017) paper, which primarily echoes the literature surveyed to this point:
…we recall that coup perpetrators should come from both the army or different elites within the state equipment—individuals who already take pleasure in a privileged standing in society. Thus, leaders looking for regime change are prone to exhaust different authorized channels earlier than perpetrating a coup and are more than likely to take action solely after they anticipate their management to trigger a major enchancment in the established order
Moreover, all of the aforementioned literature concedes that coups come up extra ceaselessly when coup plotters have real objectives of making each financial prosperity and political legitimacy. Financial prosperity could be achieved by opening an financial system to international help, funding, and worldwide enterprise transactions-all of that are strongly tied to democracy (Tusalem, 2015; Powell et al., 2017). Thus, it’s affordable to imagine that in West Africa, coups are extra usually plotted to both escape conditions of non-democracy or to strengthen democracy, since this sub-region is economically disadvantaged and politically unstable. This paper shall, subsequently, hypothesize that the percentages of a coup try occurring in an autocracy or anocracy is larger than that of a democracy, and try to validate this speculation.
Analysis Questions
A evaluation of the literature leads us to the next speculation:
H1A: Autocracies and anocracies have better odds of going through a coup try than democracies. In different phrases, as the standard of democracy will increase, the extra resilient to coups a West African nation is.
The opposite hypotheses this paper will likely be validating are:
H1B: Financial progress reduces the percentages of a coup try occurring in a rustic
H1C: Elevated ethnic fractionalization will increase the percentages of a coup try occurring in a rustic.
H1D: Elevated army resourcefulness will increase the percentages of a coup try occurring in a rustic
Empirical Evaluation
Information and analysis design
With the intention to take a look at the aforementioned hypotheses, this paper shall analyze an unbalanced panel knowledge of 15 West African international locations from 1958 to 2018. Since Cape Verde has not confronted even a single coup try on this timeframe, we’ve excluded it from the evaluation. It’s because there isn’t any variability on this topic that can provide further insights when analyzing fixed-effects. This paper will make the most of a logistic regression and take a look at it for nation fixed-effects and random results, resulting from the truth that the dependent variable is binary. On condition that we’re analyzing panel knowledge, the unit of research is country-years. All statistical analyses had been carried out on the StataMP 14.1 statistical bundle.
Purposeful type of fastened and random results logistic mannequin and easy instinct behind decoding the coefficients
Assuming that the panel knowledge has N international locations for T time intervals, the purposeful type of the logistic ‘unobserved results’ mannequin is as follows:
㏒e(pit / 1 – pit) = αi + β0 + Xitβ ∀i = 1(1)N,t = 1(1)T
Right here, pit is the conditional likelihood that a minimum of one coup will likely be tried in a rustic i in 12 months t, given Xit, β and αi. Subsequently, pit / 1-pit , is the percentages that a minimum of one coup will likely be tried in that country-year.
Xit is the 1xk matrix of impartial variables.
β is the kx1 matrix of parameters.
β0 is the intercept time period.
αi is known as ‘the unobserved impact’. This will embrace, for example, some unobserved historic or institutional elements for some nation i. Within the fixed-effects mannequin, we assume that αi is correlated with some or all the explanatory variables. Nevertheless, within the random results mannequin, αi is uncorrelated with the matrix of impartial variables.
Now, for each fashions,
pit / 1 – pit = eαi + β0 + Xitβ .
Subsequently, a one-unit enhance within the worth of impartial variable Xitj will end in a eβj issue change within the odds, ceteris paribus. If 0<eβj<1, then a rise within the worth of Xitj will result in decreased odds that a minimum of one coup will likely be tried in a country-year. If eβj>1, then a rise within the worth of Xitj will result in elevated odds that a minimum of one coup will likely be tried in a country-year. Right here, eβj would be the coefficients on every of the impartial variables within the closing estimation outcomes, and is known as the odds-ratio.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is “coup try” and was drawn from Powell and Thyne[1], who describe coups as “makes an attempt by the army or different elites throughout the state equipment to unseat the sitting head of presidency utilizing unconstitutional means”. This paper defines “coup makes an attempt” as a dichotomy, distinguishing between these country-years the place a coup try was not skilled (0) from these wherein the country-year skilled a minimum of one try (1). This paper included coup makes an attempt that succeeded or failed, just because the goal is to elucidate the elements that result in coup makes an attempt reasonably than the end result of an try.
Unbiased variables
a) This paper utilized the Polity IV[2] as a proxy to measure the standard of democracy in every country-year. A Polity rating starting from -10 to -6 locations a regime as an ‘autocracy’ (auto), -5 to -1 as a ‘closed anocracy’ (closed_ano), 0 to five as an ‘open anocracy’ (open_ano) and 6 to 10 as a ‘democracy’ (demo). Fairly than utilizing the Polity rating to measure the standard of democracy, this paper shall as an alternative denote the regime sort for every country-year. That is completed to obviously and higher distinguish regime varieties, and to conclusively take a look at our speculation. Thus, the resultant ‘regime sort’ variable is an ordinal categorical variable which could be break up into 4 dummies; for this evaluation, we will likely be utilizing the ‘demo’ dummy because the reference group. It’s anticipated that the coefficients (or odds-ratio) on the three named dummy variables will likely be better than 1
b) ‘Financial progress” (GDPPC) is denoted by the GDP per capita (US$, present costs). This knowledge was acquired from the World Financial institution database[3]. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable will likely be lower than 1.
c) Ethnic fractionalization (EF) is measured utilizing the Historic Index of Ethnic Fractionalization supplied by the Harvard.edu Dataverse database[4] for every country-year. The Index ranges from 0 to 1 and the upper the worth of the index, the better the ethnic fractionalization. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable will likely be better than 1.
d) Navy Spending (MS) of every country-year (in million US$, present costs) will act as a proxy for army resourcefulness. The information was acquired from the SIPRI Navy Expenditure Database[5]. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable will likely be better than 1.
Estimation Outcomes
The overall variety of country-years current within the panel knowledge is 867. Nevertheless, resulting from lacking values, solely 688 observations had been appropriate for evaluation. The logistic regression output is supplied in Appendix 4. The coefficients symbolize the percentages ratio related to the variable. Mannequin 1 introduces nation random results whereas mannequin 2 introduces nation fastened results. Each fashions have a excessive sufficient chi-square statistic to point the general significance of the fashions. The pseudo R-square of the fastened results specification is 0.054 which signifies a good however not glorious match.
When it comes to the estimation of the coefficients, the outcomes are constant throughout each specs. In each fashions, the estimated coefficients on the three regime varieties are better than 1. In different phrases, if a rustic switches from being a democracy to an autocracy or anocracy, the percentages of that nation going through a coup try will increase. This outcome aligns with a priori expectations, and the “regime sort” variable is statistically vital in each fashions.
Equally, in each fashions, the estimated odds-ratio on the variable GDPPC is lower than one. In different phrases, financial progress reduces the percentages {that a} nation will face a coup try in a given 12 months. This outcome aligns with a priori expectations, and this variable is statistically vital in each fashions.
The estimated coefficient on the variable EF is larger than one in each fashions. Thus, elevated ethnic fractionalization in a rustic will increase the percentages of a coup try. This aligns with a priori expectations. Nevertheless, this variable is barely statistically vital within the nation fixed-events specified mannequin. That is most likely as a result of the fixed-effects mannequin will take into account variability in ethnic fractionalization inside international locations versus between international locations just like the random-effects mannequin does. Thus, it may possibly result in adjustments within the calculation of the usual errors of the variables.
The estimated coefficient on the variable MS is larger than 1 in each fashions. Thus, elevated army resourcefulness in a rustic will increase the percentages of a coup try. This aligns with a priori expectations. This variable is statistically vital in each fashions.
Choosing applicable specification: Aikake Info Standards (AIC) and the Hausman Check
The fixed-effects mannequin has a decrease Aikake Info Standards (494.26) than the random-effects mannequin (565.56). Subsequently, the fixed-effects mannequin is a extra appropriate specification than the random-effects mannequin. To additional set up that the fixed-effects mannequin is the extra applicable specification, the Hausman Check was carried out. The chi-square statistic was excessive sufficient that we might reject the null speculation that the random-effects mannequin is suitable at 5% degree of significance. In consequence, all of the variables (together with EF) are statistically vital if we take into account the fixed-effects specification. The outcomes for the Hausman Check are given in Appendix 5.
The variance affect elements (VIFs) for the impartial variables are additionally supplied in Appendix 5; since all of the VIFs are beneath 10, we will reject the presence of multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables. The VIFs are additionally supplied in Appendix 5.
Solidifying the connection between regime varieties and their resiliency to coup makes an attempt: Cross-tabulation, Pearson’s chi-square take a look at for independence and rank-biserial correlation
The cross-tabulation in Appendix 6 reveals the frequency distribution of country-years in accordance with ‘coup try’ and ‘regime sort’. Democracies have the bottom relative frequency of country-years the place a minimum of one coup was tried out of all regime varieties (9.68%), adopted by closed anocracies (13.71%), then open anocracies (18.55%%) and eventually autocracies (58.06%). Solely 6.28% of democratic country-years have seen a minimum of one coup try, whereas 19.2% of autocratic country-years have seen a minimum of one coup try.
The Pearson’s chi-square take a look at statistic to check for independence between the 2 categorical variables is given as:
χ2 = N∑i,j pi * pj (((Oi,j / N) – pi * pj) / (pi * pj))2 ∀I = 1(1)r , j = 1(1)c
The place r is the variety of rows (on this case, 2) and c is the variety of columns (on this case, 4) within the two-way contingency desk. Right here, Oi,j is the variety of observations within the ith row and jth column. N is the full variety of observations (867). Lastly, pi is the marginal relative frequency of row i
and pj is the marginal relative frequency of column j
If the null speculation is true that the incidence of a coup try is impartial from the regime sort in a country-year, then the take a look at statistic follows a chi-square distribution with (r-1)(c-1) levels of freedom (which is the same as 3 on this case). Right here, the Pearson’s chi-square take a look at statistic is excessive sufficient that we will reject the null speculation that the incidence of a coup try is impartial of regime sort in any respect standard ranges of significance.
Nevertheless, the Pearson’s chi-square take a look at doesn’t present any data on the magnitude and route of the connection between the 2 variables. The rank-biserial correlation coefficient, which is a particular case of the Somers’ D measure, is an index of affiliation between a binary nominal variable (coup try) and an ordinal categorical variable (regime sort). The measure is calculated as:
rrb = (NC – ND) / (NC + ND + NT )
The place,
NC=303*17+303*23+303*12+148*23+148*12+113*12=22292 is the variety of concordant pairs
ND=72*148+72*113+72*179+17*113+17*179+23*179=40761 is the variety of discordant pairs
NT= (743*124)- NC– ND=29079 is the variety of tied pairs
Thus, rrb= -0.20046238. This implies that there’s a reasonable, detrimental affiliation between the incidence of a minimum of one coup try in a rustic 12 months and the regime sort.
The statistical analyses present ample proof that democracies are extra resilient to coups than anocracies and autocracies in West Africa. The better the standard of democracy, the much less is the probability of a coup try on this sub-region.
Conclusions
This paper validates the prevailing literature on the consequences of ethnic fractionalization, financial progress and army resourcefulness on the probability of a coup try occurring in West Africa. Nevertheless, the susceptibility of democracy to army coups on a worldwide scale continues to stay an empirical quandary, given the divisive nature of the literature exploring this particular relationship. It’s essential to notice, nonetheless, that the findings of this paper are in step with comparable research completed in all the Sub-Saharan Africa area. Whereas a worldwide prescription is probably not empirically substantiated, it’s clear that the antidote to the incessant regime adjustments and army supremacy on this sub-region is democratization. Step one to usher in democracy could be to fix the contaminated civil-military relations. Each civil leaders and the army should make concerted efforts to grasp their roles in nationwide service and safety. There may be additionally a have to normalize the condemnation of army intervention into politics as undemocratic. Financial growth and social cohesion amongst ethnic teams are additionally crucial to make sure political stability and sustained democratization of the sub-region.
References
Boafo-Arthur, Okay. (2008). Democracy and stability in West Africa: the Ghanaian expertise. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Division of Peace and Battle Analysis, Uppsala College.
Conteh-Morgan, E. (2000). The army and democratization in West Africa: Points, issues, and anomalies. Journal of Political & Navy Sociology, 341-355.
Owusu, M. (1971). Tradition and democracy in West Africa: some persistent issues. Africa At present, 18(1), 68-76.
Kemence, Okay. O. (2013). Understanding the basis causes of army coups and governmental instability in West Africa. Military Command and Common Employees Faculty Fort Leavenworth KS.
McGowan, P., & Johnson, T. H. (1984). African Navy Coups d’etat and Underdevelopment: a Quantitative Historic Evaluation. The Journal of Trendy African research, 22(4), 633-666.
Jackman, R. (1978). The Predictability of Coups d’Etat. American Political Science Evaluate 72: 1262-1275.
Adebajo, A. (2002). Constructing peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Janowitz, M. (1977). Navy establishments and coercion within the creating nations. College of Chicago Press.
Adebajo, A., & Rashid, I. (2004). West Africa’s safety challenges: Constructing peace in a troubled area. Lynne Rienner Writer.
Tusalem, R. F. (2015). Democracies, autocracies, and political stability. Worldwide Social Science Evaluate, 90(1), 1.
Bell, C. (2016). Coup d’état and democracy. Comparative Political Research, 49(9), 1167-1200.
Thyne, C. L., & Powell, J. M. (2016). Coup d’état or coup d’Autocracy? How coups influence democratization, 1950–2008. International coverage evaluation, 12(2), 192-213.
Huntington, S. (1968). Political Order in Altering Societies. Yale College Press
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O’Donnell, G. (1979). Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. College of California Institute of Worldwide Research.
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Information Sources:
Powell, J., & Thyne, C. (2021). Coup d’Etat Information Set [Dataset 3]. Retrieved from: http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/coup_data/dwelling.htm
Heart for Systemic Peace. (2018). Polity4 Annual Time Collection, 1946-2018. Retrieved from: https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
World Financial institution. GDP per capita (present US$). Retrieved from:
https://knowledge.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
Drazanova, L. (2019). Historic Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF). (Harvard Dataverse, V2). Retrieved from:
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doipercent3A10.7910percent2FDVNpercent2F4JQRCL
SIPRI. (2020). SIPRI Navy Expenditure Database. Retrieved from:
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
Appendix 1
Durations of Every Regime Kind in Every Nation from 1958-2018
Graph 1
Supply: Compiled by writer from the Polity IV dataset
Graph 2
Supply: Compiled by writer from the Polity IV dataset
Graph 3
Supply: Compiled by writer from the Polity IV dataset
Graph 4
Supply: Compiled by writer from the Polity IV dataset
Appendix 2
Ghana’s Polity Rating and Coup Makes an attempt (1960-2018)
| 12 months | Polity Rating | Coup Try |
| 1960 | -8 | 0 |
| 1961 | -8 | 1 |
| 1962 | -9 | 0 |
| 1963 | -9 | 0 |
| 1964 | -9 | 0 |
| 1965 | -9 | 0 |
| 1966 | -7 | 1 |
| 1967 | -7 | 1 |
| 1968 | -7 | 0 |
| 1969 | -2 | 0 |
| 1970 | 3 | 0 |
| 1971 | 3 | 0 |
| 1972 | -7 | 1 |
| 1973 | -7 | 0 |
| 1974 | -7 | 0 |
| 1975 | -7 | 0 |
| 1976 | -7 | 0 |
| 1977 | -7 | 0 |
| 1978 | 0 | 1 |
| 1979 | 6 | 1 |
| 1980 | 6 | 0 |
| 1981 | -7 | 1 |
| 1982 | -7 | 1 |
| 1983 | -7 | 1 |
| 1984 | -7 | 1 |
| 1985 | -7 | 0 |
| 1986 | -7 | 0 |
| 1987 | -7 | 0 |
| 1988 | -7 | 0 |
| 1989 | -7 | 0 |
| 1990 | -7 | 0 |
| 1991 | -4 | 0 |
| 1992 | -1 | 0 |
| 1993 | -1 | 0 |
| 1994 | -1 | 0 |
| 1995 | -1 | 0 |
| 1996 | 2 | 0 |
| 1997 | 2 | 0 |
| 1998 | 2 | 0 |
| 1999 | 2 | 0 |
| 2000 | 2 | 0 |
| 2001 | 6 | 0 |
| 2002 | 6 | 0 |
| 2003 | 6 | 0 |
| 2004 | 8 | 0 |
| 2005 | 8 | 0 |
| 2006 | 8 | 0 |
| 2007 | 8 | 0 |
| 2008 | 8 | 0 |
| 2009 | 8 | 0 |
| 2010 | 8 | 0 |
| 2011 | 8 | 0 |
| 2012 | 8 | 0 |
| 2013 | 8 | 0 |
| 2014 | 8 | 0 |
| 2015 | 8 | 0 |
| 2016 | 8 | 0 |
| 2017 | 8 | 0 |
| 2018 | 8 | 0 |
Word: “Coup try” is a dichotomous measure which assumes the worth 1 if a coup try occurred in that nation 12 months (no matter whether or not it was a plot, failed try or success)
Appendix 3
Supply: Compiled by writer from the Polity IV dataset and Powell and Thyne coup dataset
Appendix 4
Mannequin 1: Random-effects logistic regression
| Coup | Coef. | St.Err. | t-value | p-value | [95% Conf | Interval] | Sig | |
| Auto | 2.758 | 1.125 | 2.49 | .013 | 1.24 | 6.135 | ** | |
| closed_ano | 2.069 | .893 | 1.69 | .092 | .888 | 4.82 | * | |
| open_ano | 3.875 | 1.878 | 2.80 | .005 | 1.499 | 10.016 | *** | |
| GDPPC | .999 | 0 | -1.98 | .047 | .998 | 1 | ** | |
| EF | 3.215 | 5.201 | 0.72 | .47 | .135 | 76.582 | ||
| MS | 1.239 | .077 | 3.44 | .001 | 1.097 | 1.4 | *** | |
| Fixed | .028 | .039 | -2.60 | .009 | .002 | .415 | *** | |
| Fixed | -13.57 | 46.623 | .b | .b | -104.95 | 77.81 | ||
| Imply dependent var | 0.151 | SD dependent var | 0.358 | |||||
| Variety of obs | 688 | Chi-square | 30.627 | |||||
| Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | Akaike crit. (AIC) | 565.563 | |||||
| *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 |
Mannequin 2: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression
| Coup | Coef. | St.Err. | t-value | p-value | [95% Conf | Interval] | Sig |
| Auto | 2.767 | 1.196 | 2.35 | .019 | 1.185 | 6.457 | ** |
| closed_ano | 2.252 | 1.056 | 1.73 | .083 | .899 | 5.644 | * |
| open_ano | 3.371 | 1.696 | 2.42 | .016 | 1.258 | 9.035 | ** |
| GDPPC | .999 | 0 | -1.73 | .084 | .998 | 1 | * |
| EF | 1.722e+10 | 1.952e+11 | 2.08 | .038 | 3.866 | 7.671e+19 | ** |
| MS | 1.21 | .09 | 2.56 | .01 | 1.046 | 1.4 | ** |
| Imply dependent var | 0.151 | SD dependent var | 0.358 | ||||
| Pseudo r-squared | 0.054 | Variety of obs | 688 | ||||
| Chi-square | 27.402 | Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | ||||
| Akaike crit. (AIC) | 494.262 | Bayesian crit. (BIC) | 521.465 | ||||
| *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 |
Appendix 5
Hausman (1978) specification take a look at
| Coef. | |
| Chi-square take a look at worth | 11.969 |
| P-value | .035 |
Variance Affect Elements of impartial variables
| Variable | VIF |
| Auto | 3.43 |
| closed_ano | 2.26 |
| open_ano | 1.47 |
| GDPPC | 2.58 |
| EF | 7.19 |
| MS | 2.64 |
| Imply VIF | 3.26 |
Appendix 6
Tabulation of Coup Regime
| Regime | ||||||
| Coup | Autocracy | Closed Anocracy | Open Anocracy | Democracy | Whole | |
| 0 | 303 | 148 | 113 | 179 | 743 | |
| 40.78 | 19.92 | 15.21 | 24.09 | 100.00 | ||
| 80.80 | 89.70 | 83.09 | 93.72 | 85.70 | ||
| 1 | 72 | 17 | 23 | 12 | 124 | |
| 58.06 | 13.71 | 18.55 | 9.68 | 100.00 | ||
| 19.20 | 10.30 | 16.91 | 6.28 | 14.30 | ||
| Whole | 375 | 165 | 136 | 191 | 867 | |
| 43.25 | 19.03 | 15.69 | 22.03 | 100.00 | ||
| 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
Pearson Chi2 = 20.27 Prob = 0.0001
Word: First row has frequencies; second row has row percentages and third row has column percentages
[1] http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/coup_data/dwelling.htm
[2] https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
[3] https://knowledge.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
[4] https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doipercent3A10.7910percent2FDVNpercent2F4JQRCL
[5] https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
Additional Studying on E-Worldwide Relations
