With the adoption of the UAE Consensus, the parties that had gathered at COP28 in Dubai agreed to the first Global Stocktake (GST) under the Paris Agreement. On the floor of the closing plenary, many lauded this as a historic achievement since it continued to preserve the 1.5 degrees Celsius temperature target and mentioned transitioning away from fossil fuels. From a developing country’s perspective, adaptation is as crucial as mitigation. Thus, a key determinant of the success of COP28 from a Global South perspective is the outcome of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA).

Let us decode what happened concerning adaptation. To begin with, the framework of the stocktake was incomplete as it took place “without” the GGA already being in place. GGA was mandated by the Paris Agreement, and it was essential to link it to the first global stocktake. This is important since the climate crisis is being felt around the world and adaptation is the need of the hour. In the absence of GGA, this will only be a part of the next stocktake in more concrete terms five years later at COP33.
The GGA text adopted as part of the CMA 5 decision at COP28 is observed to be a subdued win for developing countries. This is because the major guiding principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities has been replaced in the text by a general reference to provisions and principles of the convention and the Paris Agreement, thereby placing an additional burden on developing countries. Further, means of implementation (MOI) for adaptation such as finance, technology transfer and capacity building, which are significant for implementing the GGA framework, also lack an actionable structure for accomplishing adaptation targets.
The GGA, as agreed in Dubai, includes 11 targets to be achieved by 2030. Seven pertain to sectors and themes such as water, agriculture, health, biodiversity, human settlements, poverty eradication, and cultural heritage. Four others pertain to adaptation cycles or responses, namely, impact, vulnerability, and risk assessment; planning; implementation; and monitoring, evaluation, and learning. Only four targets related to the adaptation cycle have been quantified. It is disappointing that there are no quantified targets concerning means of implementation.
On finance, the outcome merely reiterates the decision agreed at COP two years ago that urged developed countries to at least double their collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025. The adaptation finance, as reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for 2019 was merely $20.3 billion. If this was doubled, it would increase to $40.6 billion by 2025, which is a fraction of the required finance of $194-366 billion per year needed for adaptation as quantified by UNEP’s Adaptation Gap report. The overall language is weak when it encourages parties to consider the outcomes in their deliberations on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance. Moreover, the text recognises the need to close the adaptation finance gap, but the way forward remains in question.
Concerning the quantified targets, parties agreed to launch a two-year work programme for measuring progress on the agreed targets that would be carried out jointly post-COP28 by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation. A lot depends on this two-year process and the type of indicators it agrees on.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s definition of adaptation emphasises human and natural systems and not countries. A paradigm shift in the climate regime is needed for adaptation. There is a need to peg vulnerability from being viewed in terms of the country. The adaptation indicator framework needs to incorporate the identification of vulnerable segments at a more disaggregated level. For instance, there is a need to consider the vulnerability of farmers, coastal communities, and specific ecosystems to the impacts of the climate crisis. While the approach in climate crisis negotiations will be country-driven, the GGA indicator framework needs to factor in nuances and disaggregate the picture of vulnerability within countries.
Shailly Kedia is a senior fellow at TERI and Ishita Srivastava is a young professional at TERI. The views expressed are personal